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SCIENTIFIC GERRYMANDERING &
BIFURCATION
MEGAN EDWARDS, KATRINA FISCHER KUH & FREDERICK A.
MCDONALD*
ABSTRACT
Environmental litigation must often examine the propriety of corporate
conduct in areas of scientific complexity. In the second generation of climate
nuisance suits, for example, allegations of corporate participation in the
climate disinformation campaign are woven into plaintiffs' claims. Toxic tort
suits, currently and most notably in the Roundup and PFAS litigation,
present another area of environmental litigation grappling with the legal
ramifications of alleged corporate deception about scientific information.
Toxic tort suits often surface allegations, and in many cases disturbing
evidence, of what we term corporate "scientific gerrymandering"-
corporate efforts to finesse, slow, or even mislead scientific understanding
of the toxicity of chemicals and other products. The manner and extent to
which scientifc gerrymandering is explored and litigated within those suits
is often driven by another typical feature of toxic tort litigation-the
procedural device of bifurcation. Judges frequently bifurcate toxic tort suits
into causation and negligence phases, with the causation phase heard first.
Bifurcation in toxic tort suits involving issues of scientific gerrymandering
requires judges to decide whether evidence of scientific gerrymandering is
relevant to and may be presented uring the causation phase of a toxic tort
trial. And, typically, as Judge Vince Chhabria recently ruled in In re
Roundup Products Liability Litigation (MDL No. 2741), judges hold that
evidence of scientific gerrymandering cannot be presented or must be
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significantly limited during the causation phase because scientiic
gerrymandering is not relevant to causation.
Rulings that prevent admitting evidence of scientific gerrymandering
during the causation phase of bifurcated trials can, however, be critiqued on
both doctrinal and normative grounds. First, from a doctrinal perspective,
scientific gerrymandering-how a corporate defendant shaped scientific
knowledge about a product's risk-is often directly relevant to causation-
whether the product causes the relevant harm. This is so because effective
corporate scientific gerrymandering can define the current state of science
about product risk, particularly when questions about the extent of risk
caused by a product lie at the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Additionally,
numerous tort doctrines support shifting or reducing causal burdens in the
face of defendant misconduct, like scientific gerrymandering-which might
be likened to obscuring evidence.
Second, from a normative perspective, permitting consideration of
scientific gerrymandering during causation can be justified even where the
introduction of such evidence creates the risk that juries will erroneously find
that a product causes harm. Condemnation of scientific gerrymandering is
consistent with corrective justice because corporate scientific
gerrymandering can occasion distinct and independent harm by creating a
large group of exposed individuals who endure an extended period offearful
uncertainty until such time as the nature of that risk can be objectively
resolved, even if that product is ultimately shown not to cause the suspected
harm. Finally, from a policy perspective, allowing the introduction of
evidence of corporate scientific gerrymandering during the causation phase
of bifurcated toxic tort trials should discourage corporate actors from
engaging in scientific gerrymandering, thereby improving the efficacy of
regulation and bolstering public confidence.
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INTRODUCTION
Toxic tort suits often surface allegations, and in many cases
bring to light disturbing evidence, of corporate efforts to finesse,
slow, or even mislead scientific understanding of the toxicity of
chemicals and related products.' We coin the term scientific gerry-
mandering to refer to this conduct. The term gerrymandering is
meant to capture the sense that the conduct constitutes affirmative
manipulation that can, like contorted election districts, insidiously
but powerfully shape outcomes, in this context by defining the avail-
ability and interpretation of data. The term gerrymandering also
nods to the idea that the meaning of the outcome-e.g., election re-
sults or the current state of scientific knowledge-must be evaluated
against the process that produced it.
The manner and extent to which scientific gerrymandering
claims are explored and litigated within toxic tort suits is often
shaped by two other typical features of toxic tort litigation-the re-
quired causal showing and the procedural device of bifurcation. To
establish causation, plaintiffs must provide evidence showing that,
by a preponderance of evidence, "but for the defendant's tortious
conduct with respect to the toxic substance, the plaintiff would not
have suffered harm."2 In the context of toxic tort litigation, this usu-
ally requires a showing of both general causation-the substance or
A recent, high profile example is featured in the movie Dark Waters-based
on the book by plaintiff's attorney Robert Bilott-which shows how litigation re-
vealed years of corporate efforts to obscure knowledge of the health impacts of
perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). See ROBERT BILOTT, EXPOSURE: POISONED
WATER, CORPORATE GREED, AND ONE LAWYER'S TWENTY-YEAR BATTLE
AGAINST DUPONT (2019); see also CARL F. CRANOR, TOXiC TORTS SCIENCE, LAW
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 356-59 (2018) (describing "systematic efforts to
mislead the public and regulatory agencies about what scientific evidence shows"
and observing that current doctrine "tempts defendants to act in ways that function
to corrupt the scientific fields and their literature").
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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toxin in question has the capability of resulting in the disputed in-
jury-and specific causation-the substance or toxin actually
caused the plaintiff's injury.3 This can be a steep evidentiary hurdle
for plaintiffs.
The already difficult causal burden imposed on plaintiffs in
toxic tort litigation often becomes exacerbated when the trial is bi-
furcated-a procedural device used for efficiency reasons. Judges
frequently bifurcate toxic tort suits into causation and negligence
phases, with the causation phase heard first. Only if the plaintiff suc-
ceeds in establishing causation will the case proceed to the liability
and damages phase. When a toxic tort suit involving issues of sci-
entific gerrymandering is bifurcated, the judge must decide whether
evidence of scientific gerrymandering is relevant to and may be pre-
sented during the causation phase. As evidenced recently by Judge
Vince Chhabria's rulings in the bellwether trial Hardeman v. Mon-
santo in the In re Roundup Products Liability Litigation (MDL No.
2741), judges can view scientific gerrymandering as a distraction
from core causation questions or unduly prejudicial, and thus sig-
nificantly limit, or prohibit altogether, its presentation during the
causation phase.4
Rulings that constrain or prevent the admission of evidence of
scientific gerrymandering during the causation phase of bifurcated
trials can, however, significantly enhance the reward to defendants
for obfuscating the development of data on health risks by giving
them a forum in which the sole focus of inquiry is the adequacy of
that causation data, without acknowledging how the defendants ac-
tively shaped that data, or lack of data. These rulings can be cri-
tiqued on both doctrinal and normative grounds. From a doctrinal
perspective, scientific gerrymandering is often directly relevant to
causation. That is, how a corporate defendant shaped scientific
knowledge about a chemical or product risk bears on what is known
3 See Avila v. Willits Env't Remediation Tr., 633 F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir.
2011).
4 See Transcript of Proceedings at 74, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019). As discussed infra Part
I regarding bifurcation, it is generally recognized that limiting the focus to causa-
tion is often a means to prevent juries from hearing background evidence related
to corporate conduct.
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about whether the product caused the relevant harm. This is so be-
cause effective corporate scientific gerrymandering can define the
current state of science about risk, particularly when questions about
the presence or extent of risk lie at the frontiers of scientific
knowledge.5 Additionally, common tort and evidence doctrines sup-
port shifting or reducing causal burdens in the face of defendant
misconduct that exacerbates asymmetrical access to information,
like scientific gerrymandering.6
From a normative perspective, permitting consideration of sci-
entific gerrymandering during the causation phase of bifurcated
toxic tort trials can be justified even if the introduction of such evi-
dence increases the risk that juries will erroneously find that a chem-
ical or product causes harm. Where a defendant is held liable, but
subsequent research ultimately demonstrates that a chemical or
product does not cause the relevant harm, scientific gerrymandering,
which delays reaching a defmitive conclusion, is nonetheless a
"wrong" that creates independent and distinct harms. These harms
include magnifying risks of exposure and extending a period of fear-
ful uncertainty among those exposed until such time as the question
of extent and nature of risk can be objectively resolved.7 Moreover,
tort litigation can be a more effective process for surfacing and po-
licing corporate scientific gerrymandering than regulatory or private
governance alternatives.8 And, from a policy perspective, allowing
the introduction of evidence of corporate scientific gerrymandering
' See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING
SCIENCE: How SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 202
(2008).
6 See infra Part III (discussing alternate causation, res ipsa loquitur, and spo-
liation).
7 See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEo.
L.J. 2025, 2034-35 (1999) ("The special anxieties associated with prolonged haz-
ards can affect tremendously the lives of individuals and communities. Individuals
who have been exposed to substances whose physical effects likely will not be-
come manifest for years, perhaps decades, have reported a wide range of adverse
responses, including anxiety and anguish about their future health, depression, and
physical conditions linked to emotional distress, such as insomnia, fatigue, head-
aches, diarrhea, and muscle pain.") (citations omitted).
8 See infra Part IV (explaining how the adversarial process, discovery rules,
and other attributes of tort litigation render it more effective than regulatory pro-
cesses at ferreting out scientific gerrymandering).
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during the causation phase of bifurcated toxic tort trials would dis-
courage scientific gerrymandering, thereby increasing transparency
and rigor in research, improving the efficacy of and public confi-
dence in regulation, and enriching the informational landscape for
understanding chemical effects.
Litigation is currently unfolding over harms allegedly caused
by the manufacture, use, and disposal of glyphosate-in the
Roundup cases9-and of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances
(PFAS).10 In both contexts, plaintiffs allege that manufacturers en-
gaged in scientific gerrymandering, thus requiring judges to issue
high stakes rulings on the admissibility of evidence pertaining to
scientific gerrymandering." A close examination of the doctrinal
and normative considerations that should govern those rulings can
inform litigants and judges, and can also correct undue judicial ret-
icence to allow juries to hear evidence of scientific gerrymandering
during.the causation phase of bifurcated trials. Part I sets out the
context in which questions about the admissibility of scientific ger-
rymandering arise during toxic tort suits and provides some illustra-
tive examples of rulings on admissibility. Part II explains the evi-
dence doctrines that govern the admissibility of evidence regarding
causation in toxic tort suits. Parts III and IV then offer rationales,
both doctrinal and normative, for why judges should be more will-
ing to admit evidence of scientific gerrymandering, particularly in
the causation phase of toxic tort suits.
I. THE PROCEDURAL CONTEXT: BIFURCATION & RULINGS ON
ADMISSIBILITY
Procedural, factual, and doctrinal factors can combine to fore-
stall the disclosure of evidence related to scientific gerrymandering
at trial. Generally, when a toxic tort case is bifurcated, the causal
9 See, e.g., Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 3d 111, 131-34 (Ct.. App.
2020) (affirming that punitive damages were permissible because evidence sug-
gested Monsanto disregarded the dangers of Roundup); Pilliod v. Monsanto Co.,
No. RG17-862702, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 843, at *11 (Ct. App. Jul. 26, 2019)
(noting that there was substantial evidence that glyphosate can cause NHL and that
it did cause the plaintiffs to develop NHL).
10 See Jane Luxton & William Walsh, The 2020 Outlookfor "PFAS" Chemi-
cal Litigation: An Expanding Target Zone, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2020).
11 See, e.g., Complaint at 11-18, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., No.
4:16CV00525, 2016 WL 11574934 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 1, 2016).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
176 [Volume 29
SCIENTIFIC GERRYMANDERING & BIFURCATION
phase of the litigation is tried first. When, as is not uncommon in
toxic tort suits, plaintiffs discover evidence of alleged scientific ger-
rymandering by the defendant, the presiding judge must determine
whether the evidence can be presented to the jury during the causa-
tion phase of trial. The underlying facts related to allegations of sci-
entific gerrymandering are often hotly disputed, difficult to inter-
pret, and viewed as potentially inflammatory to jurors. Doctrinally,
evidence rules focus judges on whether evidence of scientific ger-
rymandering is relevant-defined narrowly in a bifurcated trial to
mean relevant to causation-and not unduly prejudicial. They also
afford judges significant discretion. In navigating this procedural,
factual, and doctrinal landscape, judges often appear to be extremely
cautious about, if not hostile to, admitting evidence of scientific ger-
rymandering during the causation phase. This can have the unfortu-
nate consequence of impoverishing plaintiffs' showings relating to
causation, while protecting corporate defendants from the disclosure
of gross scientific gerrymandering.
Denying admission of evidence of scientific gerrymandering in
the causation phase of a bifurcated trial is potentially fatal to plain-
tiff's opportunity to demonstrate corporate negligence at all and can
prevent that evidence from ever being publicly surfaced. This is so
because a trial judge may rule that evidence of scientific gerryman-
dering will only be allowed during the trial's latter phase, but the
trier of fact may conclude that the plaintiff has not met its burden on
causation, in which case the trial will not proceed to further phases
and that evidence-even if otherwise admissible-will never be
heard. This outcome may be particularly frustrating for plaintiffs
who contend that evidence of scientific gerrymandering may pro-
vide important context for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence on
causation. While these evidentiary rulings-on whether specific
items of evidence related to scientific gerrymandering should be ad-
mitted-can be difficult to resolve and are important to outcomes
regardless of when they arise, such rulings have higher stakes when
entertained during the causation phase of bifurcated trials.
All of these procedural, factual, and doctrinal factors are im-
portant for understanding how scientific gerrymandering is typically
raised and analyzed in toxic tort suits. This Part provides an over-
view of the current treatment of scientific gerrymandering by ex-
plaining the ubiquity of bifurcation in toxic tort suits and describing
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legal rulings that limit the admission of evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering, using the Roundup litigation as an illustrative example.
A. Bifurcation
Bifurcation is a case management echnique formally designed
to expedite the litigation process and conserve court resources. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that "for convenience,
to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may or-
der a separate trial of one or more separate issues, crossclaims, coun-
terclaims, or third-party claims."'2 Even if bifurcation might be ef-
ficient or the issues can easily be separated, however, this technique
is not meant to be utilized when the separation of issues would un-
fairly prejudice one party.13 Furthermore, the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 42 state that "separation of issues is not to be routinely
ordered" and bifurcation has been characterized as a "drastic" 4 and
nonstandard case management approach.15 Despite the limited role
envisioned for bifurcation, it is often used in environmental toxic
tort cases, which frequently present complicated scientific ques-
tions.16
Courts offer a number of reasons for bifurcating cases when
trying complex scientific issues within toxic tort litigation. First,
separation of issues is understood to conserve judicial resources by
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See also Bifurcate, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019) (describing bifurcation as "separat[ing] into two parts, esp. for conven-
ience. Multiple aspects of litigation, such as discovery, motions, defenses, trial,
and jury deliberations may be bifurcated to save time, reduce jury confusion, or
achieve other benefits, with or without the same jury hearing both bifurcated
parts.").
13 See Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993).
14 See Nye v. Ingersoll Rand Co., Civ. No. 08-3481 (DRD), 2011 WL
4017741, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2011) (citing Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil
Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Utah 1998) ("To our knowledge, so drastic a technique
has never been employed in Utah.").
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 42 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendments. The
committee also notes that although the separation of issues should not be "rou-
tinely ordered, it is important that it be encouraged where experience has demon-
strated its worth." Id.
16 See generally Albert P. Bedecarrd, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme:
Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL.
AFFAIRS L. R. 123, 151 (1989).
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preventing cases from moving forward if they fail on causation.17
Thus, bifurcation encourages judicial economy by "'obviat[ing] the
need for a jury trial on' liability or punitive damages and sav[ing]
time and money, 'which properly serve[s] the goals of Rule
42(b)."'18 For example, bifurcation is employed in sprawling prod-
ucts liability cases, such as asbestos cases, to help courts manage an
overwhelming caseload.19
Second, bifurcation may minimize the potential for prejudice
and jury confusion, as evidence relevant to other issues in the litiga-
tion may influence a jury's decision on causation.20 That said, prej-
udice and fairness are also major concerns for those who oppose
bifurcation as a case management ool.21 Plaintiffs generally argue
that bifurcation deprives the jury of understanding the context of the
litigation.22 Bifurcation can also be potentially burdensome for
plaintiffs who have to recall experts and witnesses back to the court-
room to participate in subsequent phases of litigation.23 Thus, the
bifurcation of toxic tort suits has long engendered ebate. It remains,
7 See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F.
Supp. 1212, 1221 (S.D. Ohio 1985) [hereinafter "Bendectin"]. In this case, the
court opined that the sheer volume of cases to be tried in the consolidated litiga-
tion, over 1100 cases, favored a bifurcated strategy. See id.
18 Monsanto Company's Motion to Reverse Bifurcate the Group 1 Trials at 4,
In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D.
Cal. filed Dec. 10, 2018), Doc. No. 2282 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Breeden,
410 F. App'x 6, 9 (9th Cir. 2010)).
19 See Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993).
20 See Monsanto Company's Motion to Reverse Bifurcate the Group 1 Trials,
supra note 18, at 6. See generally Bendectin, 624 F. Supp. at 1212. The Bendectin
case was a products liability litigation brought by women who took Bendectin dur-
ing pregnancy, which resulted in birth defects for their children. In the Bendectin
litigation, there was extreme concern that the presence of the affected children in
the court room would prejudice the jury against defendants. This concern led the
court to conclude that bifurcating the case and trying causation first-without the
presence of the affected children in the courtroom-would be the fairest case man-
agement strategy. See id. at 1222-24.
21 See Albert P. Bedecarr6, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurca-
tion of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENV'T AFF. L. REv.
123, 137 (1989).
22 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982).
23 See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Issue Bifurcation at 9-10, In re Roundup
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. filed Dec.
13, 2018), Doc. No. 2302.
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however, commonly employed, particularly in high stakes toxic tort
suits.24
Additionally, trial court bifurcation decisions are subject to lit-
tle appellate oversight. Trial courts have broad discretion to bifur-
cate a trial and their decisions are reviewed under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard.25 Persuading judges not to bifurcate
toxic tort suits where there is evidence of scientific gerrymandering
could mitigate, in part, the concern that defendants will benefit twice
from scientific gerrymandering: first, by using it to forestall the de-
velopment of good data connecting their harmful products to human
health harms, and second, by relying on that artificial lack of data
during the causation phase of a bifurcated trial to achieve a quick
dismissal of the case. For this Article, however, we focus on inform-
ing and encouraging greater permissiveness in admitting evidence
of scientific gerrymandering even when trials are bifurcated. This
may prove to be a more feasible prospect than revisiting burned-
over debates about the propriety of bifurcation in the first instance.
This approach also focuses needed scrutiny on scientific gerryman-
dering and its influence on litigation, and can have broader value by
informing rulings on the admissibility of evidence that reveals sci-
entific gerrymandering, even when a trial is not bifurcated.
B. Hardeman as an Illustration/Example of Evidentiary Rulings
Involving Scientific Gerrymandering in Bifurcated Trials
A brief review of the allegations relating to scientific gerry-
mandering and admissibility rulings in Hardeman v. Monsanto Co.
helps to illustrate the difficulties that can arise when courts evaluate
the admissibility of evidence of scientific gerrymandering during
the causation phase of a bifurcated toxic tort suit.26
24 See Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 725
(2000) ("[F]ederal judges regularly employ bifurcation in complex litigation such
as mass tort cases. Bifurcation is also common in patent litigation, complex envi-
ronmental litigation, antitrust litigation, and complex employment litigation.")
(listing cases) (citations omitted); see also Bedecarr6, supra note 21, at 124-26
(noting and critically examining the increasing separation of causation from other
trial phases in environmental toxic tort suits).
25 See Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 3d 1346 (J.P.M.L. 2016)
(centralizing cases in the Northern District of California). Note, some of the pre-
trial rulings discussed were decided for and applicable to all of the centralized
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1. Plaintiff/Defendant Claims and Arguments
In Hardeman-a bellwether trial in the centralized multidistrict
litigation In Re Roundup Products Liability Litigation-the plaintiff
alleged that Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup, failed to warn
consumers about the alleged risk of the glyphosate-containing herb-
icide,27 and that he developed Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma (NHL)
after regularly using Roundup during home gardening beginning in
the 1980s.28 The plaintiff contended that other ingredients in
Roundup, such as "the surfactant polyethoxylated amine (POEA),
render Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own." 2 9
Plaintiff brought several causes of action against Monsanto re-
garding the safety of Roundup, including claims sounding in negli-
gence, design defect, failure to warn, and breach of implied war-
ranty.30 Key to plaintiff's claims were allegations that Monsanto
misrepresented information about the risks of Roundup to consum-
ers, the scientific community, and regulators through, in part, scien-
tific gerrymandering.31 For example, plaintiff alleged that Monsanto
employed a variety of strategies to distort, slow, obfuscate, or oth-
erwise shape the development and understanding of risks posed by
Roundup.32 Those strategies included covertly authoring, editing, or
otherwise influencing the content of published articles, known as
"ghostwriting"; aggressive promotion of Roundup-favorable stud-
ies, even those which Monsanto knew to be seriously flawed; sup-
pression, misrepresentation, and unfounded attacks on research and
cases; other rulings were limited to Group 1 trials, and yet others were specific to
the Hardeman case. See id. at 1348; see also In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig.,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6820, MDL No. 2741, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2019).
27 See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 3d at 1347.
28 See id. at 1348; Complaint at 11, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., No.
4:16CV00525, 2016 WL 11574934 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 1, 2016).
29 See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 3d at 1348.
30 See Complaint at 11-18, Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., No. 4:16CV00525,
2016 WL 11574934 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 1, 2016).
31 E.g., id. at 12 (alleging that Monsanto was negligent in part for "[c]onceal-
ing information from the Plaintiff while knowing that Roundup was unsafe, dan-
gerous, and/or non-conforming with EPA regulations" and "[i]mproperly conceal-
ing and/or misrepresenting information from the Plaintiff, scientific and medical
professionals, and/or the EPA, concerning the severity of risks and dangers of
Roundup compared to other forms of herbicides").
32 See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Issue Bifurcation, supra note 23, at 10-14.
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researchers, that yielded unfavorable conclusions-which the plain-
tiff refers to as "academic bullying"; early cessation and suppression
of unfavorable study results; and concerted and sometimes disingen-
uous lobbying of regulators by, among other things, withholding
and misrepresenting data.33
Pretrial proceedings first addressed general causation, that is,
whether glyphosate can cause NHL at realistic levels of exposure.34
This is an issue applicable to all of the Roundup cases that had been
centralized into the multidistrict litigation. Specific causation, ad-
dressing whether a particular plaintiffs NHL was caused by glypho-
sate, was left for independent resolution in each individual action.35
As is typical in toxic tort suits, Monsanto moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that plaintiffs failed to produce evidence from
which a rational juror could find that general causation was satisfied.
Judge Chhabria, in what he characterized as a "very close question,"
admitted the expert opinions of three of plaintiffs' experts and de-
nied Monsanto's motion for summary judgment, finding that the
plaintiffs had proffered sufficient evidence of general causation to
proceed to trial.36 Judge Chhabria's pretrial order denying summary
judgment on general causation and resolving the parties' Daubert3 7
motions undertook a close examination of the evidence relating to
general causation and is discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.
Monsanto responded to the denial of its motion for summary
judgment by moving to bifurcate the Group 1 trials into two phases:
33 See id.
34 See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1108-11 (N.D.
Cal. 2018).
35 See id. at 1111.
36 See id. at 1108-09.
37 Judges must decide whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
allowed into evidence and considered by factfmders (usually juries); they under-
take their evaluation of expert testimony using the standard announced by the Su-
preme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. See Garcia v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 390, at *1, n.4 (Fed. Cl. May 19,
2010) ("A Daubert motion is a motion to exclude methodologically unreliable ex-
pert witness testimony, typically filed in limine, to prevent such dubious testimony
from confusing and even tainting the factfinder. It is premised on the Supreme
Court case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).").
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specific, or medical, causation (Phase 1), and negligence and dam-
ages (Phase 2).38 Monsanto cited judicial economy as one rationale
for bifurcation, claiming that it "could avoid the presentation of days
of company conduct and regulatory evidence through multiple wit-
nesses that might prove unnecessary if the jury finds for Monsanto
on either of the 'close' questions of causation."39 Monsanto focused
even more on the need for bifurcation to avoid undue prejudice and
jury confusion on the issue of causation, emphasizing that the jury
should concentrate on evaluating "causation based on the actual sci-
entific studies and evidence."40 Monsanto argued that "bifurcation
would avoid the risk that the jury becomes distracted or misled by
extraneous evidence of corporate conduct" and cited to plaintiffs'
attorneys' references to how Monsanto "generated junk science"
and acted with a "desire to manipulate scientists" as examples of
evidence that had "no relevance to the proposed phase one issue of
causation."41 Monsanto also drew the court's attention to prior prec-
edent-previous mass tort litigations involving asbestos, Bendectin,
DES, diet drugs, and hormone replacement herapy-where courts
employed bifurcation.4 2
Plaintiffs resisted bifurcation, noting, in particular, that it
would be "impossible to separate evidence that is probative of cau-
sation from evidence that is probative of liability" because of the
"overlap in light of Monsanto's pervasive manipulation, fabrication,
and intimidation of the very science underlying causation."43 Plain-
tiffs highlighted evidence of scientific gerrymandering by Monsanto
and explained that such evidence would be critical to both causation
and liability, concluding:
There is considerable evidence that Monsanto engaged in various
forms of scientific manipulation, including ghostwriting and ac-
ademic bullying. These actions have infected the body of scien-
tific work considered by the Parties' experts, regulatory agencies,
38 See Monsanto Company's Motion to Reverse Bifurcate the Group 1 Trials,
supra note 18, at 1. The Group 1 trials included three bellwether cases, Hardeman
v. Monsanto, Stevick v. Monsanto, and Gebeyehou v. Monsanto. See id at 11.
39 Id. at 8.
40 Id. at 2, 6, 8.
41 Id at 7, 8 nn.7-8.
42 See id. at 1-2 & 5.
43 Plaintiffs' Opposition to Issue Bifurcation, supra note 23, at 1.
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and overall academic community. In this context, the line be-
tween "liability" and "causation" evidence does not exist.44
Plaintiffs also flagged that if bifurcation limited the presenta-
tion of evidence about scientific gerrymandering, it could prejudice
the jury. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that, "if [they were] pre-
vented from presenting evidence about how Monsanto influenced
and corrupted science and regulators, then the jury [would] be left
with a nagging question-if this product can cause cancer, why has
it been on the market for over forty years with no warning?"45
The parties' briefing on the motion to bifurcate nicely frames
the interplay between bifurcation and evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering. From Monsanto's perspective, evidence of scientific
gerrymandering was only relevant, if at all, to corporate conduct and
liability but not to causation, and was, moreover, highly likely to
confuse or prejudice jury evaluations of causation evidence. From
plaintiffs' perspective, evidence of scientific gerrymandering was
deeply enmeshed with, and indeed crucial to, a full understanding
of the state of science with respect to the causal question. Judge
Chhabria eventually decided to bifurcate the trial.46 The parties' un-
derlying dispute continued in the form of protracted wrangling
about whether to admit specific items of evidence related to scien-
tific gerrymandering during the causation phase.47
2. Judge Chhabria's Rationale for Bifurcation
In ruling to bifurcate the trial, Judge Chhabria drew a distinc-
tion between Monsanto's efforts to mislead regulators and the pub-
lic, on the one hand, and more direct interference with specific sci-
entific studies, on the other.4 8 He signaled that the former were
44 Id at 12.
4s Id at 10.
46 See Pretrial Order No. 61 Re: Bifurcation at 1-2, In re Roundup Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2019), Doc. No.
2406.
47 See infra Part I.B.3.
48 See Pretrial Order No. 61 Re: Bifurcation, supra note 46, at 1-2.
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relevant only to liability and thus not admissible during the causa-
tion phase.49 He indicated that the latter, however, might be admis-
sible during the causation phase, particularly in the context of plain-
tiffs' efforts to impeach expert witnesses offered by Monsanto.50
Notably, both the parties and Judge Chhabria focused to a great
extent on whether, when, and how jurors would be allowed to hear
evidence about EPA's regulation of glyphosate,51 as well as a report
49 See id. at 1 ("These issues are relevant to punitive damages and some liabil-
ity questions. But when it comes to whether glyphosate caused a plaintiff's NHL,
these issues are mostly a distraction, and a significant one at that.").
5o See id. at 2 ("[I]f the plaintiffs have evidence that Monsanto manipulated
the outcome of scientific studies, as opposed to agency decisions or public opinion
regarding those studies, that evidence may well be admissible at the causation
phase.").
5 EPA conducted an initial peer review of glyphosate in 1985, classifying
glyphosate as a Group C chemical, a Possible Human Carcinogen, based on the
results of a study on male mice which developed kidney tumors after exposure to
glyphosate. See EPA OFF. OF PESTICIDE PROGRAM, GLYPHOSATE ISSUE PAPER:
EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC POTENTIAL 12-13 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/glyphosateissue paper_evalua-
tion_of carcincogenicpotential.pdf [hereinafter GLYPHOSATE ISSUE PAPER].
Monsanto worked hard to persuade EPA to reconsider its determination by, among
other things, hiring pathologists to re-evaluate the mouse study. See Carey Gillam,
Of Mice, Monsanto and a Mysterious Tumor, U.S. RIGHT TO KNOW (June 8, 2017),
https://usrtk.org/pesticides/of-mice-monsanto-and-a-mysterious-tumor/. One year
after the initial review of glyphosate was conducted in 1985, EPA requested that
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Scientific Advi-
sory Panel (SAP) evaluate the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate, and this panel
determined that the data which had been used to classify glyphosate as a Group C
chemical did not reach statistical significance. See GLYPHOSATE ISSUE PAPER, su-
pra note 51, at 12-13. This group also recommended that glyphosate be classified
as a Group D chemical, "Not Classifiable as to Human Carcinogenicity." Id After
this suggestion, two additional rat carcinogenicity studies were submitted and a
new review of glyphosate was undertaken by the Carcinogenicity Peer Review
Committee-this Committee concluded that glyphosate should be classified as a
Group E Chemical, "Evidence of Non-Carcinogenicity for Humans based upon
lack of evidence for carcinogenicity in mice and rats and the lack of concern for
mutagenicity." Id at 13 (internal quotations omitted). The most recent study was
done in September of 2015, when the Committee classified glyphosate as "Not
Likely to be Carcinogenic to Humans." Id EPA published a comprehensive report
on the carcinogenicity of glyphosate in 2016, and this review concluded that "[t]he
strongest support is for 'not likely to be carcinogenic to humans' at doses relevant
for human health risk." Id at 140. EPA's evaluation of glyphosate has been criti-
cized for being unduly influenced by Monsanto and other private interests, failing
to cognize exposure levels consistent with Roundup application, failing to consider
the full range of peer-reviewed literature, and failing to consider the effects of the
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issued by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
classifying glyphosate as a Group 2A carcinogen.2 Judge Chhabria
ultimately ruled that evidence relating to EPA's approval and
IARC's classification were admissible during the causation phase,
but he limited discussion of each organization's conclusions be-
cause "the primary inquiry is what the actual studies show," not
what EPA or IARC concluded based upon them.53 Plaintiffs' alle-
gations of scientific gerrymandering focused on Monsanto's mach-
inations to influence the presentation of science to, or the interpre-
tation of the scientific conclusions of EPA and IARC.54 Perhaps for
this reason, the parties and Judge Chhabria often addressed ques-
tions about the admission of evidence of scientific gerrymandering
in the context of evaluating the admission of evidence relating to
EPA's and IARC's decisions. Judge Chhabria explained:
A significant portion of the plaintiffs' case involves attacks on
Monsanto for attempting to influence regulatory agencies and
manipulate public opinion regarding glyphosate. These issues
are relevant to punitive damages and some liability questions.
But when it comes to whether glyphosate caused a plaintiff's
NHL, these issues are mostly a distraction, and a significant one
at that. ... [I]f the plaintiffs have evidence that Monsanto ma-
nipulated the outcome of scientific studies, as opposed to agency
decisions or public opinion regarding those studies, that evidence
may well be admissible at the causation phase. Any such evi-
dence will likely overlap with evidence of liability, but it will not
full Roundup formulation (as opposed to glyphosate alone). See Charles M.
Benbrook, How Did the US EPA and IARC Reach Diametrically Opposed Con-
clusions on the Genotoxicity of Glyphosate-Based Herbicides?, 31 ENv'T ScI.
EuR., Jan. 14, 2019, at 1-3.
52 See IARC Monograph on Glyphosate, INT'L AGENCY FOR RSCH. ON CANCER
(Mar 1, 2016), https://www.iarc.fr/featured-news/media-centre-iarc-news-glypho-
sate/. Group 2A, Probably Carcinogenic to Humans, indicates that "[t]here is
strong evidence that a given chemical can cause cancer in humans, but at present
it is not conclusive." Standard IARC Classification, Sci. CoMMs., https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/health/scientific_committees/opinionslayman/en/electromagnetic-
fields/glossary/ghi/iarc-classification.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
53Pretrial Order No. 78: Guidance for the Parties Re: Motions in Limine at 1,
In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 12, 2019), Doc. No. 2707.
54 See Pretrial Order No. 61 Re: Bifurcation at 1-2, In re Roundup Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2019), Doc. No.
2406.
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be impossible, as the plaintiffs contend, to separate evidence of
causation from evidence of liability.55
However, it would ultimately prove time-consuming and vexing to
separate evidence of causation from evidence of liability with re-
spect to scientific gerrymandering.
3. Motions in limine and Other Rulings Relating to the Admission
of Evidence of Scientific Gerrymandering
Bifurcating the case made it necessary to evaluate the admissi-
bility of evidence of scientific gerrymandering during the causation
phase. This produced protracted, high-stakes disputes over the res-
olution of motions in limine and other rulings,56 as evidenced by
contemporary news reports.57 A review of the arguments made and
decisions rendered about the admissibility of evidence of scientific
gerrymandering illustrates both the difficulty of separating evidence
of scientific gerrymandering from causation and the way in which
situating decisions about admissibility of evidence of scientific ger-
rymandering within the causation phase skews against its admis-
sion.
Judge Chhabria attempted to establish a "guiding principle" to
govern the admissibility of evidence of scientific gerrymandering in
the causation phase, explaining that documents related to "a partic-
ular study that is going to be at issue with respect to causation"
might be admissible, but "internal Monsanto communications about
5 Id
56 See, e.g., Letter Brief, Monsanto's Discovery of a Tumor in the Control
Group When It Re-Reviewed the Knezevich and Hogan Mouse Study, In re Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 15, 2019),
Doc. No. 2492 (briefing a dispute related to the admissibility of evidence relating
to Monsanto's efforts to finesse through reinterpretation study results previously
submitted to EPA).
57 Indeed, numerous news outlets reported that Bayer AG saw its share price
rise 6% upon Judge Chhabria's ruling to bifurcate the trial and limit the introduc-
tion of evidence of scientific gerrymandering during the causation phase. See, e.g.,
Donato Paolo Mancini, Bayer Shares Jump After Monsanto Weedkillers Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2019; Tina Bellon, U.S. Judge Stands by Ruling to
Limit Evidence in Roundup Cancer Trials, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 4,
2019. See generally Daniel Siegal, Monsanto Gets Gift with Two-Stage Roundup
Bellwether, LAw360 (Feb. 20, 2019) https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/l 130082/monsanto-gets-gift-with-two-stage-roundup-bellwether.
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how to sway a scientist" would generally not be admissible.58 From
his perspective, internal Monsanto documents showing how Mon-
santo sought to influence the scientific and regulatory processes-
memos "about the ways we can attack" a study-might be more akin
to "a kind of political strategy document," and, therefore, were less
likely to be admissible than an internal Monsanto document offering
an "objective assessment" of a study.59 Judge Chhabria cited to the
need to balance probative value and risk of prejudice under Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.60 In conducting such analysis, he
stated that many internal Monsanto documents involving strategy
about how to shape the science were "only tangentially relevant to
the primary [issue] at hand in Phase I" and "a significant distrac-
tion."61 Ultimately, resolution of questions about the admissibility
of evidence of scientific gerrymandering were difficult, causing
Judge Chhabria to remark, "sometimes it's going to be hard to de-
cide whether something falls in Phase I or Phase II but we're going
to do the work and we're going to figure it out." 62
Taken together, the parties' arguments relating to the admissi-
bility of evidence of scientific gerrymandering, Judge Chhabria's
reasoning in parsing those arguments, and the rulings that deter-
mined what evidence the jury was allowed-and not allowed-to
hear, indicate that evidence of scientific gerrymandering is less
likely to be admitted during the causation phase. In other words, un-
dertaking evaluations regarding the admissibility of scientific ger-
rymandering evidence during the causation phase of bifurcated trials
skews strongly against the admission of such evidence. That evi-
dence is more likely to be admitted when trials are not bifurcated,
and causation and negligence arguments are heard together.
In both cases-bifurcated trials and those that are not-deci-
sions about whether to admit a particular item of evidence relating
58 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 4, at 5-6.
59 Id at 6-7. The guidelines articulated by Judge Chhabria were meant to pro-
vide a general approach for resolving specific admissibility determinations before
and during trial.
60 FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.").
61 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 4, at 6-7.
62 Id at 42.
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to scientific gerrymandering can be idiosyncratic to the specific ev-
idence offered, and not all evidence of scientific gerrymandering
will be admitted regardless of the phase of the trial in which it is
offered-this is perhaps because, as explained below, it is deemed
to be unduly prejudicial. Yet, generally speaking, it makes sense that
plaintiffs will have a harder time persuading judges to admit evi-
dence of scientific gerrymandering during the causation phase of bi-
furcated trials. This is so because, as discussed in further detail in
Part II.B, the touchstone of admissibility is relevance. Evidence of
scientific gerrymandering may not be as readily understood to speak
directly to the core question of causation, namely whether a chemi-
cal in fact caused a harm. Moreover, evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering paints the defendant in a negative light, leading to con-
cerns that it will prejudice the jury or confuse the issues. As judges
weigh probative value against the potential for prejudice, the per-
ception that evidence is less relevant in a particular context thus
changes the calculation regarding admissibility. Additionally,
judges making decisions about whether to admit evidence of scien-
tific gerrymandering during the causation phase of bifurcated trials
do so against the backdrop of the already-made decision to bifurcate,
which is often justified, in part, by appeals to judicial economy. De-
fendants will argue-and judges may be concerned-that allowing
scientific gerrymandering evidence will needlessly complicate and
prolong the causation phase because such evidence will need to be
revisited during the negligence phase of the trial. Finally, judges
may have the sense that any negative impact of excluding evidence
of scientific gerrymandering in causation phases is mitigated by
keeping open the possibility that such evidence will be admitted in
later negligence and damage phases.63 Together, all of these factors
conspire against the admission of evidence of scientific gerryman-
dering in the causation phase of bifurcated trials.
These dynamics were evident in Hardeman. For its part, Mon-
santo referred to plaintiffs' evidence about how it had worked to
shape scientific understandings as "real sideshows that would mis-
lead the jury" and that would not "advance the ball in terms of the
bottom line of what the science shows."64 Pushing back against
63 Even though the failure to allow such evidence during the causation phase
may reduce the chances of plaintiffs reaching the negligence and damage phases.
64 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 4, at 9, 17.
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plaintiffs' request to admit a Monsanto scientists' email character-
izing the results of a study, Judge Chhabria commented, "We're not
saying it's irrelevant. We're saying it's not for Phase I, that under
403 it's a sideshow.... The emphasis should be on the science."65
And his evidentiary rulings relating to evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering accordingly differentiate with respect to Phase 1 and
Phase 2. Judge Chhabria granted Monsanto's motion in limine to
exclude evidence of ghostwriting for Phase 1, but denied it for Phase
2, reasoning that the "evidence is not relevant (or, at best, is margin-
ally relevant) to causation, so its admission during Phase 1 would
be unduly prejudicial and would waste the jury's time. During Phase
2, however, this evidence is far more relevant."66 Similarly, he
granted Monsanto's motion in limine to entirely exclude evidence
of public-relations activities for Phase 1 while observing that
"[n]on-cumulative evidence of Monsanto's public-relations activi-
ties relating to glyphosate will generally be relevant and admissible
during Phase 2," and inviting Monsanto to "bring a ... targeted mo-
tion before the beginning of Phase 2" related to the admissibility of
such evidence.67
Judge Chhabria endeavored to draw a line between evidence
that went "primarily to what did Monsanto know and when did it
know it and how did it try to manipulate the regulators," which he
viewed as generally not admissible in the causation phase, and evi-
dence about the science of causation, which he viewed generally to
be admissible.68 However, this distinction did not necessarily re-
solve questions about Monsanto's role in developing the science of
causation. In resolving disputes related to Monsanto's role, Judge
Chhabria's approach was sometimes to limit the admission of evi-
dence of scientific gerrymandering to impeachment, or to allow it
only if Monsanto opened the door in some way, for example by re-
65 Id. at 74.
66 Pretrial Order No. 81: Ruling on Motions in Limine at 1-2, In re Roundup
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18,
2019) 2019 WL 1371806, at *1.
67 Id. at *2.
68 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 4, at 74-75.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
190 [Volume 29
SCIENTIFIC GERRYMANDERING & BIFURCATION
lying on a specific study with respect to which plaintiffs had evi-
dence of manipulation.69 Referring at one point to evidence of, in
Judge Chhabria's words, "Monsanto's efforts to work" a scientist,
Judge Chhabria seemed inclined to think that such evidence was
more likely to come in as impeachment evidence if Monsanto of-
fered an expert whose testimony opened the door, but not as affirm-
ative evidence of causation in plaintiffs' case in chief.70 As another
example, Monsanto sought a motion in limine, preventing the intro-
duction of evidence of "post-use corporate conduct,"-meaning ev-
idence of corporate conduct after a particular plaintiff stopped using
Roundup-which included evidence of how Monsanto sought to in-
fluence scientific understandings of related health risks.71 While
Monsanto conceded that "science going to causation is relevant even
if it post-dates the Plaintiffs' use of Roundup," it nonetheless ob-
jected to such evidence, arguing that "Plaintiffs will seek to paint
Monsanto's post-use activities as attempts by Monsanto to silence
detractors of glyphosate, [and] influence science and regulators,"
which would be unduly prejudicial.72 Judge Chhabria granted Mon-
santo's motion to exclude post-use corporate conduct in both
phases, "subject to a limited exception for evidence of Monsanto's
alleged efforts to influence the outcome of a study that Monsanto
relies on at trial." 73 This approach-allowing evidence of scientific
gerrymandering in specific instances only if Monsanto opened the
door-ultimately gave Monsanto control over how to structure its
case so as to potentially avoid the admission of evidence of scien-
tific gerrymandering by declining to present studies or experts
where plaintiffs could point to evidence of their manipulation.
69 See Pretrial Order No. 67: Ruling on Initial Evidentiary Submissions at 1,
In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, No. 16-md-02741-VC (N.D.
Cal. filed Jan. 30, 2019), Doc. No. 2586 (ruling that plaintiffs could only introduce
an expert's evaluation "if Monsanto presents expert testimony . . . or otherwise
opens the door through cross-examination").
70 See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 4, at 32-34.
71 See Monsanto Company's Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine No. 7
Re: Post-Use Corporate Conduct, In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2741, No. 3:16-md-02741-VC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019), Doc. No. 2775.
72 Id. at 3-5.
73 Pretrial Order No. 81, supra note 66, at 3.
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4. Implications of the Hardeman Motion Decisions
The treatment of evidence of scientific gerrymandering in Har-
deman provides an illustrative example and descriptive context that
inform the doctrinal and normative analyses that follow. There are,
it should be noted, numerous other examples of scientific gerryman-
dering and associated evidentiary disputes. For example, DuPont's
efforts to suppress, shape, and obfuscate information about the risk
of PFOA74 were revealed through discovery in landmark toxic tort
litigation.75 In his book, The Optimistic Environmentalist, David
Boyd comments on the ubiquity of scientific gerrymandering and its
influence on our understanding of chemical risk:
Industries whose products come under attack routinely follow a
game plan based on tobacco industry tactics. First they deny the
existence of any problems. They pay charlatan scientists to lie
and say their products or emissions are safe. They finance scien-
tific journals with official-sounding titles to publish bogus arti-
cles based on junk science. They wield their wealth in efforts to
buy the support or acquiescence of politicians and bureaucrats.76
He then goes on to illustrate this pattern beginning in the 1920s
with respect to multiple chemicals and industries.77 Scientific gerry-
mandering is thus common, well-documented, and recognized to
have significant consequences. Our review of cases and the relevant
literature supports a few key generalizations. Plaintiffs in toxic tort
suits often allege that defendants engaged in a range of scientific
gerrymandering activities, and discovery may reveal evidence that
supports these claims.78 Unfortunately, this evidence may never be
74 PFOA is a type of synthetic chemical that when exposed to humans can
cause adverse health effects. See EPA, EPA's PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL
SUBSTANCES (PFAS) ACTION PLAN 9 (2019).
75 See BILOTT, supra note 1, at 297 (describing how DuPont and 3M helped to
perpetuate a "massive data gap" about the health impacts of PFOA).
76 DAVID R. BOYD, THE OPTIMISTIC ENVIRONMENTALIST: PROGRESSING
TOWARDS A GREENER FUTURE 133 (2015).
77 See id. at 133-37 (referencing lead, mercury, asbestos, polybrominated di-
phenyl ethers, atrazine, and BPA as examples).
78 Plaintiffs' attorneys can also engage in scientific gerrymandering. This Ar-
ticle focuses on corporate (defendant) gerrymandering, which tends to be more
systemic, more sophisticated, more influential on scientific understanding, and
less readily discovered and challenged through the traditional adversarial process.
See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 26-32 (recognizing that plaintiffs'
attorneys sometimes bend science but concluding that "the regulated industries
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heard by jurors. This is because cases are often bifurcated, with cau-
sation tried before negligence and damages. Causation is typically a
difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in toxic tort cases and, while evidence
of scientific gerrymandering can provide important context for eval-
uating plaintiffs' showings on causation, judges may be reluctant to
hear evidence of scientific gerrymandering during the causation
phase of the trial. As will be discussed in the next Part, this interplay
may make it more challenging for plaintiffs to prove causation and
could prevent evidence of scientific gerrymandering from ever com-
ing to light.
II. RELEVANCE, SCIENTIFIC GERRYMANDERING, AND TOxIC TORT
CAUSATION
Fierce debates about the complex scientific, doctrinal, and nor-
mative considerations attendant in evaluating causation in the toxic
tort context have resulted in the development of a very specific
showing required to establish causation. This standard, in turn, pro-
vides the backdrop against which judges rule on the admissibility of
causation evidence in toxic tort suits, including evidence of scien-
tific gerrymandering. For the reasons that follow, scientific gerry-
mandering can powerfully shape whether, when, and how plaintiffs
are able to make necessary showings regarding causation and thus
should be considered relevant to causation.
A. Causation and Scientific Gerrymandering
One of the greatest hurdles that plaintiffs face in toxic tort law-
suits is proving causation.79 Before attempting to explain why and
how evidence of scientific gerrymandering is relevant to causation,
we first offer a detailed explanation of the requirements for estab-
lishing causation in toxic tort suits. To establish causation, a plaintiff
tend to be the dominant players in the science bending drama.") (citation omitted).
Evidence of scientific gerrymandering by plaintiffs should also, however, be ad-
missible.
79 See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation
to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENv'T L. &
POL'Y REv. 1, 6, 18 (2001) ("[C]ausation has proven a very effective stumbling
block that has not only precluded compensation for all but the most clearly under-
stood environmentally caused diseases, but has also stood in the way of ambitious
attempts to protect the public health generally through toxic tort litigation.").
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must usually show both general and specific causation.80 General
causation requires a showing that the substance or toxin in question
has the capability of resulting in the disputed injury.81 Specific cau-
sation, on the other hand, requires a showing that the substance or
toxin actually caused the plaintiff's injury.82 Although both show-
ings can be difficult for plaintiffs, general causation is often the
threshold, if not central, question in toxic tort litigation.83
To establish general causation, aplaintiff must "prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that .. . the substance .. . [is] capable of
causing the disease."84 With very few exceptions,85 the means for
understanding the health impacts of a chemical are complex, expen-
sive, push at the frontiers of or exceed current scientific capacity,86
80 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010) ("The plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that, but for the defendant's tortious conduct with respect to
the toxic substance, the plaintiff would not have suffered harm. When group-based
statistical evidence is proffered in a case, this means that he substance must be
capable of causing the disease ("general causation") and that the substance must
have caused the plaintiff's disease ("specific causation"). In other cases, when
group-based evidence is unavailable or inconclusive, and other forms of evidence
are used, the general and specific causation issues may merge into a single in-
quiry.").
"81 See Avila v. Willits Env't Remediation Tr., 633 F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir.
2011).
82 See id.
83 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010) ("The special problem in these [toxic sub-
stances] cases, however, is proving the connection between a substance and devel-
opment of a specific disease."); see also McGarity, supra note 79, at 18 ("Because
the general causation issue does not involve factual evidence about the individual
plaintiff, defendants frequently raise the general causation issue early in the devel-
opment of a trial by way of motions for summary judgment.") (citation omitted).
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010).
85 Some examples include chemicals with acute effects (i.e., an effect that de-
velops quickly) or that cause signature diseases. See id.
8 See id. ("Occasionally, biological-mechanism evidence is sufficiently de-
veloped to prove general causation. More frequently, however, the evidence con-
sists of scientific studies comparing the incidence of disease in groups of individ-
uals (epidemiologic evidence) or animals (toxicologic evidence) with different
levels of exposure. . . . Epidemiologic studies are expensive and can take consid-
erable time to design, conduct, and publish. For disease processes with long la-
tency periods, valid studies cannot be performed until the disease has manifested
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and rarely yield definitive results.87 Each of these means, including
controlled human studies, animal studies,88 epidemiological stud-
ies,89 and chemical studies, have their own sets of limitations.90 Fur-
thermore, plaintiffs generally suffer from both resource and infor-
mation asymmetry, as defendants tend to have many more resources
and superior access to information about the chemical.9 1
The practical, scientific challenges of discerning chemical ef-
fects on human health become even more daunting when considered
in the context of a toxic tort suit and evaluated against the standard
for proving causation. Proving causation almost always requires that
the plaintiff offers expert testimony. Courts serve as "gatekeepers,"
limiting which experts can testify, what studies can be used as the
basis for that testimony, and whether evidence deemed admissible
is sufficient for the plaintiff to get the case before the jury.92 Judges
typically rule first on whether proffered expert testimony is admis-
sible under Federal Rule of Evidence 70293 and then, in deciding
motions for summary judgment or other dispositive motions,
itself. As a consequence, some plaintiffs may be forced to litigate long before ep-
idemiologic research is available.").
87 See McGarity, supra note 79, at 14-34 (identifying and exploring the com-
plexities associated with these methods of risk assessment in the context of a toxic
tort suit).
88 Defendants in toxic tort lawsuits often attempt to exclude animal studies as
not relevant during the causation inquiry. A common relevance problem that often
arises with animal studies is that the levels of exposure animals undergo is often
higher than that of human exposure. Aside from varying levels of exposure, an-
other relevance concern is that the same level of exposure that affects one species
(i.e., an animal) might not have the same effect on another species (i.e., a human).
As such, courts can be reluctant to admit animal studies even though scientists and
federal regulators rely on them. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
139 (1997).
89 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239-
40 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting courts' traditional reluctance to rely on epidemiolog-
ical studies); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards
of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379-80 (1986).
90 See McGarity, supra note 79, at 14.
91 See WENDY WAGNER & WILL WALKER, INCOMPREHENSIBLE! 134-35
(2019) (explaining why chemical manufacturers are in the best position to assess
the risk from the chemicals they produce).
92 See FED. R. EvID. 104(a) ("The court must decide any preliminary question
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissi-
ble.").
93 See FED. R. EvID. 702.
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whether the admissible evidence is sufficient for a reasonable fact
finder to find that the plaintiff has met its burden.94 A trilogy of Su-
preme Court cases-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,95 General Electric Co. v. Joiner,96 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Car-
michael97-as well as the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as
amended in 2000, both firmly position judges as "gatekeep[ers]"98
tasked with ensuring the relevance and reliability of scientific evi-
dence offered in toxic tort suits.99 The Supreme Court points judges
toward a non-exhaustive set of rigorous factors to consider when
evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence'00 and invites
judges to evaluate both experts' "conclusions and methodology"
and to reject testimony where "too great an analytical gap [exists]
between the data and the opinion proffered."10' Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 702 expressly instructs judges to permit an individual to offer
expert testimony only if "the testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data" and "is the product of reliable principles and methods,"
which "the expert .. . reliably applied ... to the facts of the case."'02
Within this framework, individual trial judges impose differing
levels of stringency with respect to the scientific evidence that they
deem admissible. Appellate courts review trial judges' rulings on
the admissibility of expert testimony under an abuse of discretion
standard,10 3 which is highly deferential.104 Additionally, appellate
94 See McGarity, supra note 79, at 18.
95 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
96 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
97 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
98 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
99 See id. at 589-90.
100 This includes whether a method can or has been tested; the known or poten-
tial rate of error; whether the methods have been subjected to peer review; and
whether the methods are generally accepted. See id. at 593-94.
tot Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
102 FED. R. EVID. 702.
103 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
104 See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 680 (6th Cir. 2010) (Martin,
J., dissenting) ("'[Abuse of discretion review] requires a reviewing court to be
highly deferential when assessing not just a trial court's analysis of each [Daubert]
factor, but also the trial court's initial selection of which factors are relevant to the
case at hand.' It is within the district court's discretion to determine whether the
testimony provided is inadmissible 'junk science' or testimony falling within the
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courts in different circuits adopt divergent approaches for evaluating
those rulings on expert testimony in toxic tort suits, as some circuits
place more stringent requirements on expert admissibility than oth-
ers.105 Significant questions relating to expert testimony on causa-
tion might include whether a judge will deem animal studies rele-
vant, require plaintiffs to produce an epidemiological study-
perhaps even requiring that the study show a doubling of the relative
risk of chemical exposure-or allow an expert to testify based on a
weight of the evidence approach that takes into account a range of
studies of varying types and weighing them to account for the limi-
tations.106 In particular, where knowledge about the health effects of
a chemical is developing and disputed, judges' rulings about the ad-
missibility of expert testimony offered by plaintiffs to prove causa-
tion can be crucial and outcome determinative. In light of the rele-
vant timeframes and costs involved, it simply may not be possible
for plaintiffs to cure identified deficiencies in their evidence of cau-
sation, even if further study later provides better evidence of chem-
ical harm.
Despite variation in the standards employed by individual trial
judges and across various circuits with respect to appellate review
of those rulings,107 as well as heated debate about the optimal level
'range where experts might reasonably differ.") (first quoting Johnson v. Mani-
towoc Boom Trucks, Inc. 484 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2007); then quoting Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999)). As a result, "[a court] must
conduct [its] review of [a trial court's] decision with great deference." Tamraz,
620 F.3d at 680.
105 Compare Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 17, 20 (1st
Cir. 2011) (holding that a trial judge erred by failing to admit expert evidence
based on a holistic, weight of the evidence approach), with Allen v. Pa. Eng'g
Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the weight of the evidence
methodology).
106 See McGarity, supra note'79, at 22-27; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010)
("Occasionally, courts have suggested or implied that a plaintiff cannot meet the
burden of production on causation without epidemiologic evidence").
107 Compare Milward, 639 F.3d at 11, 17, 20, with Allen, 102 F.3d at 198. See
also David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It's Time to Amend
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 10 n.40, 41-42, 42
n.229 (2015) (discussing the circuit split and listing cases).
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of judicial scrutiny and the minimum required showings from par-
ties,108 it seems fair to say that judges generally subject experts, the
methodologies they employ, and the studies upon which they rely in
toxic tort actions, to meaningful and often close judicial scrutiny.
The Hardeman case is instructive on this point.109 Judge Chhabria
issued a sixty-eight page ruling on the parties' Daubert and sum-
mary judgement motions that related to both the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony regarding causation and whether plaintiffs had of-
fered sufficient evidence of general causation to warrant the case
proceeding to a jury." 0 His decision reviews, in detail, the epidemi-
ological studies, animal studies, and mechanistic data-evidence of
the biological mechanism by which glyphosate might cause cellular
changes-and, in addition, "examines each of the plaintiffs' ex-
perts' opinions, and analyzes whether those opinions synthesize all
this evidence reliably enough to be admissible at trial." 1
The decision shows how, to satisfy his "gatekeeping" role un-
der Daubert and Joiner, Judge Chhabria undertook an in-depth ex-
amination of both the specific studies relied upon and methods em-
ployed by the experts whose testimony the parties sought to offer at
trial. For example, he ruled that one aspect of a plaintiff expert's
testimony regarding biological plausibility in the assessment of an-
imal carcinogenicity was inadmissible to the extent that the expert
used a particular "pooling method" to assess whether glyphosate
108 Compare McGarity, supra note 79, at 19 (lamenting that Daubert and its
progeny have produced a "corpuscular" approach to the admissibility of causation
evidence that unduly prevents claims from reaching juries), and Thomas O.
McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Regulatory Science in Rulemaking and Tort: Uni-
fying the Weight of the Evidence Approach, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 65, 97-
99 (2013), and CRANOR, supra note 1, at 138 (arguing for a weight of the evidence
approach), with Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 107, at 40-43 (criticizing courts
for being too permissive in admitting unreliable expert estimony on toxic tort cau-
sation and recommending that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 be amended to re-
quire greater scrutiny).
109 Another instructive example is the scrutiny afforded to plaintiff's evidence
of causation in General Electric Co. v. Joiner. See 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997); see
also McGarity, supra note 79, at 19-21 (recounting how the Supreme Court up-
held the district court's rejection of myriad studies with respect to whether PCBs
cause lung cancer).
110 See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1108-09 (N.D.
Cal. 2018).
11" Id. at 1109.
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causes cancer in various rodent carcinogenicity studies.'1 2 He care-
fully parsed another expert's treatment of latency across different
studies."3 After careful review, he concluded that the testimonies of
three experts for the plaintiffs were inadmissible for various reasons
that were specific to aspects of each, even though he described the
first expert as "eminently qualified" and having authored written re-
ports of "high quality";" 4 noted that the second expert had "more
than forty years of toxicology experience, and had worked for the
National Cancer Institute and National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences," and was "for many years responsible for the prep-
aration of the Report on Carcinogens, a congressionally mandated
public health report";"5 and recognized that the third expert was a
hematologist and medical oncologist whose clinical practice fo-
cused on treating patients with NHL. 16 Although Judge Chhabria
organized his admissibility determinations around the relatively per-
missible Ninth Circuit standard for admitting expert testimony,"7 he
still engaged in a painstakingly detailed examination of the expert
testimony as required under Daubert and Joiner, discussed above.
Despite excluding the three proffered testimonies, Judge Chhabria
did admit three plaintiff expert opinions. He emphasized, however,
that it was a "close question," and that plaintiffs had made an ade-
quate showing on general causation to resist summary judgment."8
He also augured that, "[g]iven how close the question is at the gen-
eral causation phase, the plaintiffs appear to face a daunting chal-
lenge at the next phase," with respect to presenting sufficient evi-
dence of specific causation.19 Notably, the fact that the IARC had
recently classified glyphosate as probably carcinogenic to humans
appears to have hindered as much as helped plaintiffs in the Rule
702 analysis. Judge Chhabria reasoned that the standard for the clas-
12 See id. at 1134-38.
' 3 See id at 1122.
"4 See id at 1144-46.
15 Id at 1146.
116 See id at l148.
117 See id at 1111.
118 See id at 1151.
''9 Id. at 1109.
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sification differed from the legal standard for showing general cau-
sation-preponderance of the evidence-and thus critiqued plain-
tiffs' experts for undue reliance on the IARC study.120
B. Relevance and Scientific Gerrymandering
As has been shown above, developing sufficient evidence that
a chemical causes harm, such that it can be heard by a jury, is quite
difficult and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Indeed, admissibility
sometimes turns on the availability or assessment of a single study
or expert. This helps to illustrate the power of scientific gerryman-
dering; successfully stalling or tainting a single study might prevent
plaintiffs from reaching a jury.
Scientific gerrymandering can take many forms. In two of his
works,121 Thomas McGarity identifies and describes in detail the
many "science-bending strategies for use in anticipation of litigation
or regulation" deployed by "[r]isk-producing industries."12 2 He be-
gins by observing that "to the extent that the industries are the ones
conducting or contracting for the relevant health and environmental
studies, they have a great deal of influence over how the studies are
conducted, and they can frequently control whether adverse results
ever see the light of day."12 3 He then goes on to list and describe a
host of mechanisms that companies use to shape science even when
they do not have such direct control, including:
" Attacking studies with adverse conclusions prior to publica-
tion by orchestrating negative peer reviews and urging jour-
nals not to publish them;
" Demanding that journals retract or correct published scientific
studies containing adverse conclusions;
" Financing critical letters to the editor in scientific journals af-
ter publication;
120 See id. at 1108.
121 See Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science
Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Re-
sponsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. K AN. L. REv. 897,
914-921 (2004); MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 38-40 (summarizing
strategies for bending science, including "shaping science," "hiding science," "at-
tacking science," "harassing scientists," "packaging science," and "spinning sci-
ence").
122 McGarity, supra note 121, at 914.
123 Id
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" Assembling a panel of sympathetic experts to evaluate adverse
studies;
" Harassing scientists who produce adverse results by com-
plaining to their superiors, threatening to sue them, and/or
lodging spurious scientific misconduct complaints;
" Sponsoring counter-research aimed at producing contradic-
tory results;
" Abusing the peer review process by using industry consultants
and industry-funded academics to recommend against the
publication of studies with adverse results; and
" Demanding and reanalyzing scientific data underlying re-
search producing adverse results.12 4
In their book Incomprehensible!, Wendy Wagner and Will
Walker relate other tactics used by what they refer to as "Rule-
Bender" chemical manufacturers, including observing that "[t]he
Rule-Bender's motivation to provide biased research can be so sub-
stantial that the Rule-Bender will even hire an entire cadre of scien-
tists and reserve-through contract-the right to control their re-
search."2 5 They report further that 15 percent of U.S. scientists
admit to having "changed the design, methodology, or results of a
study under pressure from a funding source."1 2 6
Through these efforts, chemical proponents can significantly
shape and define the state of scientific knowledge about the health
risks of chemicals.'2 7 It follows that they can complicate and, in
some cases, delay or prevent development of an objective under-
standing of chemical risks, as well as slow or prevent government
regulation and decrease the availability of evidence to satisfy the
burden of showing causation in litigation.128 Together, these efforts
both forestall lawsuits and prevent cases from getting to the jury or
124 See id at 914-21.
125 WAGNER & WALKER, supra note 91, at 141 (citation omitted).
126 Id at 141-42 (citing Meredith Wadman, One in Three Scientists Confesses
to Having Sinned, 435 NATURE 718 (2005)).
127 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 60-180.
128 See WAGNER & WALKER, INCOMPEHENSIBLE!, supra note 91, at 140-47; see
also MCGARITY & WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE, supra note 5, at 181-203;
BILOTT, EXPOSURE: POISONED WATER, CORPORATE GREED, AND ONE LAWYER'S
TWENTY-YEAR BATTLE AGAINST DUPONT, supra note 1.
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succeeding at trial.129 The efficacy of gerrymandering, in turn, cre-
ates a strong temptation and incentive to engage in gerrymandering.
Scientific gerrymandering is thus relevant to causation. To be
admissible, evidence must be relevant.'30 Evidence is considered
relevant when "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less prob-
able than it would be without the evidence; and ... the fact is of
consequence in determining the action."'3 1 In the present context,
the question would be whether evidence of scientific gerrymander-
ing helps a fact finder understand whether a chemical causes a par-
ticular harm.13 2 In the Hardeman case, for example, plaintiffs
needed to prove that "glyphosate .. . can cause Non-Hodgkin's
Lymphoma ("NHL") at exposure levels people realistically may
129 In short, defendants can avoid lawsuits by obscuring the connection between
plaintiff harm and chemical exposure and then, when lawsuits are brought, again
rely on obscured causation and demanding evidentiary requirements to avoid lia-
bility. See McGarity, supra note 121, at 914-921, 927 ("In a toxic tort or products
liability case, the plaintiff must introduce reliable evidence that is relevant to the
question of cause and effect. The epidemiological evidence that is typically re-
quired to make this showing, however, is precisely the sort of evidence that is most
susceptible to the corpuscular attacks and other science-bending strategies.").
130 See FED. R. EvID. 402 ("Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.").
131 FED. R. EvID. 401. As indicated by Judge Chhabria in his rulings, select
evidence of scientific gerrymandering may also be admitted in the context of im-
peaching an opposing party witness. It is important to note, however, that relying
on impeachment for the admission of evidence of scientific gerrymandering is ul-
timately unsatisfying as much evidence might not fit in that box. Defendants could
control whether impeachment evidence can be offered through their strategic trial
choices and, moreover, impeachment must fall within specified categories, includ-
ing contradiction, reputation for honesty, inconsistent statements, bias, perception,
convictions, or prior bad acts. See FED. R. EVID. 408, 607, 608, 613, 609, 704.
Though less common, psychiatric history is another category of impeachment. See
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Although the
use of psychiatric evidence 'does not fall within the traditional pattern of impeach-
ment, the law should be flexible enough to make use of new resources."').
132 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010) ("The plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that, but for the defendant's tortious conduct with
respect to the toxic substance, the plaintiff would not have suffered harm. When
group-based statistical evidence is proffered in a case, this means that the sub-
stance must be capable of causing the disease ("general causation") and that the
substance must have caused the plaintiff's disease ("specific causation").").
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have experienced" and that "each particular plaintiff's NHL was
caused by glyphosate."1 33
In short, the relevance analysis could be stated as follows: does
evidence of scientific gerrymandering help shed light on whether a
chemical causes harm? As described above, in most toxic tort cases,
whether a chemical causes harm is a complex question requiring
reference to and evaluation of a large body of scientific evidence,
explored through expert analysis of epidemiological, animal, and
mechanistic studies. Evidence of scientific gerrymandering pro-
vides context for understanding, weighing, and interpreting that
body of scientific learning.
Does the fact that Company X orchestrated a smear campaign
against a researcher whose work showed that Chemical Y caused
tumors in rodents make it more likely that Chemical Y causes can-
cer? No, of course not. But might the smear campaign have contrib-
uted to the failure of that researcher and her work to gain broader
acceptance, dissuaded future work regarding the carcinogenicity of
chemical Y, and helped chemical Y to avoid earlier or more rigorous
scrutiny from regulators? It seems that the answer here is, almost
certainly, yes. Further, it seems that understanding that Company X
orchestrated the smear campaign would help a fact finder accurately
evaluate the researcher's work, including its reception by others in
the field, as well as educate a fact finder about how to interpret the
constellation of available studies. The smear campaign raises the
possibility that a paucity of studies showing harm might not actually
indicate a lack of harm, but, that the process through which studies
are conducted and promoted was possibly subjected to pro-chemical
corporate influence. From there, a fact finder might infer that Com-
pany X engaged in the smear campaign because the researcher's
work, in fact, raised legitimate substantive concerns about whether
Chemical Y causes cancer-something akin to consciousness of
guilt or consciousness of liability or responsibility-that is, the com-
pany's own suspicion that the chemical might in fact pose risks.3 4
133 In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1108 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
134 Courts adjudicating civil matters have admitted evidence of consciousness
of guilt. See W.P. RICHARDSON & JEROME PRINCE, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON
EVIDENCE § 4-611 (11th ed. 1995) (citing Parrott v. Pelusio, 65 A.D.2d 914 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978)). However, many do not necessarily refer to this sort of evidence
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Evidence of scientific gerrymandering is thus relevant to toxic tort
causation because the landscape of evidence related to causation is
complex and contested, with specific studies and conclusions em-
bedded in and almost inseparable from the much larger corporate,
scientific, and regulatory ecosystem that produces them.
Judges, however, seem inclined, almost reflexively, to view ev-
idence of scientific gerrymandering as irrelevant or tangentially rel-
evant to causation. In Hardeman, for example, Judge Chhabria
granted Monsanto's motion in limine to exclude evidence of ghost-
writing135 during the causation phase, reasoning that the "evidence
is not relevant (or at best marginally relevant) to causation, so its
admission during Phase 1 would be unduly prejudicial and would
waste the jury's time." 36 Yet, viewed in light of the scientific and
evidentiary processes just described, a strong case can be made that
evidence of ghostwriting is central to understanding the totality of
the scientific evidence relating to causation.1 37
As one specific example, plaintiffs alleged that Monsanto sci-
entists ghostwrote the article Safety Evaluation and Risk Assessment
of the Herbicide Roundup and its Active Ingredient, Glyphosate, for
Humans, attributed to Williams, Kroes, & Munro.1 38 The article,
as conscious of guilt, but rather, consciousness of liability, see, e.g., Rock v.
McHenry, 115 S.W.3d 419, 420-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003), or consciousness of re-
sponsibility, see, e.g., Birch v. Juehring, No. 8-218, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 441,
at *6--8 (App. Div. Iowa 2008).
135 Ghostwriting is the "practice of ... companies secretly authoring journal
articles published under the byline of academic researchers." Chung-Lin Chen,
Assessing Potential Legal Responses to Medical Ghostwriting: Effectiveness and
Constitutionality, 5 J. L. BIOSCIENCES 84, 85 (2018).
136 Pretrial Order No. 81, supra note 66.
137 See generally McGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 76-79 (describing
the practice and effect of ghostwriting and observing that "[s]everal examples of
ghostwritten articles downplaying the risks of a sponsor's products are available").
138 Compare Carey Gillam, Remarks Before a Joint Hearing of the European
Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and
the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development 2-3 (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://usrtk.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/1 0/Presentation-before-the-European-
Parliament.pdf, with Monsanto Did Not Ghostwrite the Williams et al. (2000)
Glyphosate Paper, MONSANTO NEWS RELEASE (March 17, 2017), https://geor-
gia.growingamerica.com/news/2017/03/monsanto-did-not-ghostwrite-the-wil-
liams-et-al-2000-glyphosate-paper-2017-03-17/. See also E-mail from William
Heydens, Chief Scientist, Monsanto, to Donna Farmer, Toxicologist, Monsanto
(Feb. 19, 2015, 07:53), https://perma.cc/8JN4-F7PB.
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which undertook a review of existing studies and research and con-
cluded that there was "no convincing evidence" that Roundup or
glyphosate were genotoxic, carcinogenic, or caused developmental
toxicity, was highly influential.139 It was cited over four hundred
times, integrated into the science surrounding the toxicity of glypho-
sate, and likely influenced the extent and direction of future re-
search, as well as regulatory decisions."' Plaintiffs contended that
this "infected the body of scientific work" regarding Roundup,14' as
the William, Kroes, & Munro article was considered the seminal
piece.about glyphosate and Roundup's genotoxicity profile.14 2 As
evidence that Monsanto impacted the direction of future research
and regulation of Roundup at an important fork in the road, plaintiffs
noted that the ghostwritten article was published not long after Mon-
santo allegedly buried a report that had called for further studies af-
ter it concluded that glyphosate was mutagenic and caused break-
ages in chromosomes that might lead to cancer.4 3 This was but one
example of Monsanto's influence on the scientific landscape; jour-
nalist Carey Gillam reviewed documents released in conjunction
with the Roundup litigation and concluded that Monsanto "did not
merely produce or influence a few studies but 'dozens or hundreds,'
which were subsequently re-cited in other publications as evidence
refuting risk." 44
1 See Gary M. Williams et al., Safety Evaluation and Risk Assessment of
Herbicide Roundup and Its Active Ingredient, Glyphosate, for Humans, 31 REG.
TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 117 (2000).
140 This figure was found through the citation report for this article generated
by Web of Science. For an example of how the article was relied upon in later
work, see, e.g., Helmut Greim et al., Evaluation of Carcinogenic Potential of the
Herbicide Glyphosate, Drawing on Tumor Incidence Data from Fourteen
Chronic/Carcinogenicity Rodent Studies, 45 CRITICAL REVS. IN TOXICOLOGY 185,
202 (2015) ("With regard to potential carcinogenic effects of glyphosate, the unan-
imous outcome of these reviews has been that the data provide sufficient evidence
to conclude that glyphosate should not be considered a carcinogen. Genotoxicity
studies with glyphosate, conducted under conditions stipulated by internationally
accepted testing guidelines and GLP, as reviewed in 2000 (Williams et al.
2000).").
141 Plaintiffs' Opposition to Issue Bifurcation, supra note 23, at 12.
142 See id. at 12-13
143 See id.
144 Katherine Drabiak, Roundup Litigation: Using Discovery to Dissolve
Doubt, 31 GEO. ENV'T L. REv. 697, 702 (2019) (citing CAREY GILLAM,
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When courts fail to recognize the relevance of evidence of sci-
entific gerrymandering to causation, the practical implications can
be compounded. In a bifurcated case, a finding that the evidence is
not relevant to causation-although it may be relevant to negligence
or damages-may significantly hamper the plaintiff's ability to
make its case to the jury regarding causation and ultimately, that
evidence may never be admitted if the jury does not find that the
plaintiff has met its causal burden. Second, as discussed in greater
detail below, even if a court views evidence of scientific gerryman-
dering as relevant, it will decline to admit the evidence if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by a danger of "unfair preju-
dice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury."1 4 5 A failure to
appreciate the core relevance of evidence of scientific gerrymander-
ing-that it is not just useful as evidence of bad corporate conduct
relevant to assessing negligence or damages, but also critical to de-
veloping a nuanced understanding of the evidence of causation-
may cause judges to erroneously treat evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering as unduly prejudicial.
III. UNFAIR PREJUDICE, SCIENTIFIC GERRYMANDERING, AND
ESTABLISHED TORT AND EVIDENCE DOCTRINES
Even if scientific gerrymandering is relevant to general causa-
tion and therefore prima facie admissible, judges might nonetheless
exclude evidence of scientific gerrymandering upon a finding that
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of "un-
fair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury."' 46
This Part explains why judges should be less inclined to view evi-
dence of scientific gerrymandering as problematically prejudicial
and hence inadmissible, particularly at the causation phase. First,
juror responses to evidence of scientific gerrymandering are not nec-
essarily unduly prejudicial as an evidentiary matter. Second, to the
extent that the risk about which courts are worried about comes to
WHITEWASH: THE STORY OF A WEED KILLER, CANCER, AND THE CORRUPTION OF
SCIENCE (2017)).
145 FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.").
146 Id
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fruition-i.e., jurors are influenced by evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering and overlook weak plaintiff evidence of causation-a
number of other tort and evidence doctrines suggest that this is not
in fact much of a risk, as that outcome is consistent with existing
tort and evidence doctrines. This is further the case because norma-
tive arguments augur in favor of erring on the side of discouraging
scientific gerrymandering conduct.
Juries presented with evidence of corporate scientific gerry-
mandering sometimes hold toxic tort defendants liable even where
evidence of causation is relatively weak. It is oft-hypothesized that,
in so doing, juries are commingling the substantive causal ques-
tion-does Chemical X cause cancer?-with a desire to punish de-
fendants for engaging in wrongdoing.147 Judges may interpret this
as unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues, the danger of which
is sufficiently pronounced and potentially harmful to warrant exclu-
sion of evidence of scientific gerrymandering during the causation
phase of bifurcated toxic tort trials.'48
This approach seems reasonable on the surface. A defendant's
efforts to avoid the development or acceptance of a scientific link
between its chemical and harm, while unseemly, does not make the
chemical more or less likely to cause cancer. Hence, the thinking
147 E.g., David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457,
505 (1999) (reviewing MARCIA ANGELL, M.D., THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996)) ("[J]uries fre-
quently rule against manufacturers in the absence of sufficient evidence of causa-
tion to punish them for misbehavior, particularly when there is scientific uncer-
tainty on the underlying causation issue.") (citing to articles by Margaret A.
Berger, Feldman, and Wendy Wagner); Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous For-
tune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1122-25,
1172-74 (1998); Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1643
n.157 (2001) (identifying this as an example of civil jury nullification).
148 Thomas McGarity posits that concerns about commingling on causal ques-
tions have even motivated the "corpuscular" approach to Daubert gatekeeping in
toxic tort cases. See McGarity, supra note 79, at 41. In In re Roundup Products
Liability Litigation, Judge Chhabria granted Monsanto's request to bifurcate the
trial and significantly limit the evidence of scientific gerrymandering that could be
introduced during the causation phase, reasoning that "plaintiffs' ... attacks on
Monsanto for attempting to influence regulatory agencies and manipulate public
opinion regarding glyphosate.... when it comes to whether glyphosate caused a
plaintiff's NHL, these issues are mostly a distraction, and a significant one at that."
Pretrial Order No. 61, supra note 55, at 1. He did, however, concede that the "ev-
idence that Monsanto manipulated the outcome of scientific studies . .. might be
admissible during the causation phase." Id. at 2.
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goes, weighing the fact that a defendant engaged in scientific gerry-
mandering when evaluating whether the plaintiff has shown that a
chemical causes harm is unfairly prejudicial because it rests the de-
cision of causation on an "improper basis," moreover one that is
"emotional" in the sense that it is driven by anger at the company.'4 9
Scratch the surface, however, and it becomes apparent that this
reasoning is facile. As explained in Part II, through scientific gerry-
mandering, defendants deliberately shade and shape the universe of
information about a chemical and its effects that is available to reg-
ulators, plaintiffs, and, eventually, fact finders in trials. It is there-
fore both proper and fair, when evaluating what causal conclusion
to draw from the science, to learn not just the current state of the
science, but also to understand that it has been defined and shaped,
in part, by defendants' strategic choices. This understanding also
applies to remaining uncertainties and knowledge gaps in the sci-
ence. Scientific gerrymandering can work in powerful ways to shape
the availability, perceptions, and actual state of scientific knowledge
on a subject. As McGarity and Wagner point out, "collective scien-
tific knowledge does not always result from scientists dutifully ap-
plying the scientific method, but instead sometimes reflects success-
ful efforts by advocates to influence researchers and research
outcomes," to the point where "the increasingly pervasive practice
of shaping science appears to be altering the trajectory of scientific
knowledge."150 As discussed in Part II, scientific gerrymandering
includes a range of conduct intended to shape the state of science:
declining to conduct research into product risks; suppressing inter-
nal research about product risks; withholding or misrepresenting
data to researchers; shutting down studies whose early results look
threatening; "actively work[ing] to obfuscate especially damaging
information produced by others"; undertaking an "affirmative cam-
paign of disinformation and obfuscation"; attacking the integrity of
researchers to "distract or even intimidate academic or government
scientists whose research has adverse implications for a company";
149 See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
10 MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 95-96.
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and "fmanc[ing] counter-research designed to refute third-party re-
search, either by producing different results or by suggesting that
the results of the independent research cannot be reproduced."'1
Moreover, it is consistent with long-established tort and evi-
dence doctrines to consider informational asymmetries and interfer-
ence when deciding whether a plaintiff has satisfied its burden, in-
cluding specifically with respect to causation. As explained below,
important tort doctrines-Summers v. Tice alternate causation and
res ipsa loquitur-recognize that a defendant's access to superior
information and wrongful interference with the production of infor-
mation provide compelling reasons to lessen the causal burden on
plaintiffs.15 2 Juries responding to less-than-definitive evidence on
causation can rationally determine, consistent with these doctrines
and the element of general causation, that the defendant's scientific
gerrymandering impoverished the informational landscape and
evaluate the parties' respective showings on causation through that
lens.153 When juries do so, they are not making an "inferential er-
ror,"15 4 but they are engaging in sound reasoning that many other
doctrines attest is relevant to evaluating causation.'55 To deny juries
151 Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental
Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.
J. 1619, 1641-49, 1651, 1655-56 (2004) [hereinafter Wagner, Commons Igno-
rance]; see also Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products
Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L. J. 693, 716-17 (2007) [hereinafter Wagner,
When All Else Fails].
152 See discussion infra Part IILA.
153 See Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 151, at 716-17 (positing that
juries might, without inappropriate emotion or scientific misunderstanding, factor
in the reasons for incomplete evidence on causation, such as a defendant's mis-
conduct, and grant a spoliation-like presumption on causation to the plaintiff).
154 See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Na-
ture of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 506 (1983) (positing
that evidence should be understood to be unfairly prejudicial based on its propen-
sity to cause a trier of fact to commit inferential error and explaining that "[i]nfer-
ential error occurs when the jury incorrectly decides that evidence is probative of
an alleged fact or event").
155 Indeed, judges may likewise rationally and without unfair prejudice or issue
confusion give plaintiffs a boost on causation where a defendant obscures evidence
of causation. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 832 (1997) [hereinafter Wagner, Choos-
ing Ignorance] (explaining how a judge in the Missouri Court of Appeals over-
looked deficiencies in plaintiffs' proof on causation because the defendant's own
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that important contextual backdrop may, in fact, make it harder for
juries to accurately assess causation, as it is widely recognized that
the party bearing the burden "needs evidentiary depth to tell a con-
tinuous story."156 Moreover, the evidentiary doctrine of spoliation
sanctions defendants for destroying evidence, often by-inviting ju-
ries to infer that the disappeared evidence would have benefited the
plaintiff. That doctrine likewise has some salience in the present
context, where defendants use scientific gerrymandering to shape-
or misshape-the state of scientific evidence about chemical risks.
Notably, the identified tort and evidence doctrines go much far-
ther than simply factoring informational absence or misfeasance
into weighing parties' showings on causation. These doctrines often
shift the burden entirely to defendants to show that they did not
cause the plaintiff's harm.15 ' In the case of spoliation, a judge may
even require that relief be granted for the plaintiff.158 These doc-
trines are not directly applicable to scientific gerrymandering, nor is
it argued that they should be. Rather, the doctrines are raised and
explored to support the more general propositions that: (1) linking
evidence of informational misfeasance to evaluations of causation
is common, accepted, and justified; and (2) even if juries do respond
to such evidence by inferring that, in the absence of defendant's sci-
entific gerrymandering, better information supporting a causal con-
nection between a chemical and harm would exist, that is a reason-
able conclusion related to the causal question, and one that is not
improper or unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.
A. Tort Doctrine and Burden-Shifting Causation
The burden-shifting rule of Summers v. Tice, also called alter-
native-cause, allows a tort defendant who did not cause harm to the
plaintiff to be held liable when certain conditions are met. In Sum-
mers v. Tice, two defendants carelessly discharged their shotguns in
the direction of the plaintiff.1 59 A shot from the gun of one of the
conduct wrongly prevented plaintiffs from accessing information about toxic
chemical releases).
156 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997).
157 See discussion infra Parts III.A-III.B (describing the relevant doctrines).
158 See id.
159 See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948).
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defendants hit the plaintiff in the eye, but the plaintiff, through no
fault of his own, could not discern who had fired the shot.160 The
burden then shifted to each defendant to prove that it was not his
shot that hit the plaintiff. This burden-shifting invites and blesses an
outcome where a defendant who did not in fact cause the plaintiff
harm, but is unable to prove so, is held liable.'61
The situation where a plaintiff is harmed by exposure to a toxic
substance and relevant information about causation is muddied by
scientific gerrymandering is, in some obvious and significant ways,
distinct from the Summers v. Tice paradigm. In a Summers v. Tice
situation, a defendant's negligence clearly harms the plaintiff, alt-
hough it is unclear whose. In the toxic tort situation, however, it is
possible that the plaintiff's chief harm is not caused by negligence
at all. For example, it may be that the plaintiff's cancer was not
caused by exposure to the defendant's chemical. However,. im-
portant policy justifications for the burden-shifting permitted in
Summers v. Tice are not only present but arguably more pronounced
when defendants engage in scientific gerrymandering that obscures
whether the defendant's product caused the plaintiff's harm.
Summers v. Tice allows burden-shifting, in part, because of the
asymmetry of information regarding causation between the plaintiff
and defendant.162 The defendant is understood to be in a superior
position to know or investigate whether it caused the plaintiff's
harm.163 This kind of information asymmetry is at its zenith as be-
tween a corporate chemical owner and an exposed individual. 64 The
corporate chemical owner possesses proprietary information about
the chemical, a team of in-house scientists, and access to data about
chemical test results. Conversely, it may be challenging for a plain-
tiff to know that he was exposed to a given chemical, let alone that
160 Seeid
161 See id at 3 ("The one shot that entered plaintiff's eye . . . could not have
come from the gun of both defendants. It was from one or the other only.").
162 See id at 4 ("The injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfair
position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm. . . .Ordinarily defendants
are in a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the
injury.").
See id
164 See Wagner, When All Else Fails, supra note 151, at 698-700 (explaining
the reasons for information asymmetry between a product manufacturer and ex-
posed individual).
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the chemical might cause a particular type of harm or, indeed, plain-
tiff's actual harm.165 Those injured by toxic substances can properly
be considered "the party least capable of initiating the lengthy sci-
entific process needed to assess risk, as plaintiffs usually begin with
no relevant information and inferior resources."66
Information asymmetry is a strong justification for burden-
shifting in tort law. For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
allows fact finders to infer that a defendant's negligence caused the
plaintiff's harm even in the absence of evidence about what caused
the accident. This is because the defendant possesses superior
knowledge or access to information about the occurrence, which
weighs in favor of giving the jury a res ipsa instruction, or granting
the plaintiff a res ipsa inference.1 67 Indeed, eminent torts scholar
Judge Guido Calabresi identifies information asymmetry as one of
three considerations integral to understanding res ipsa cases, re-
marking on the importance of assessing "which of the parties is in a
better position either to reveal or to seek out explanatory evidence"
or "which side has more knowledge and therefore which side should
bear the incentive to come forward with the evidence." 68
165 See generally Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 151, at 1633-58
(2004) (explaining information asymmetries involving the manufacturers of prod-
ucts and factors giving rise to and exacerbating those asymmetries).
166 Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2131 (1997).
167 See Pacheco v. Ames, 69 P.3d 324, 327 (Wash. 2003) ("[T]he purpose of
the rule is to require the defendant to produce evidence explanatory of the physical
cause of an injury which cannot be explained by the plaintiff.") (quoting Morner
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 196 P.2d 744, 751-52 (Wash. 1948)). Indeed, asymmetry
of information is required in some jurisdictions to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. See DeBusscher v. Sam's E., Inc., 505 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2007)
("Under Michigan's version of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must
establish that ... [e]vidence of the true explanation of the event must be more
readily accessible to the defendant han to the plaintiff.").
168 Williams v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 391 F.3d 411, 424 (2d Cir. 2004) (Cal-
abresi, J., concurring); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 (AM. L. INST. 2010) ("[E]ven though the de-
fendant's superior access to information is not a prerequisite for res ipsa loquitur,
courts sometimes consider the extent of the defendant's access in res ipsa cases.").
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Another factor justifying burden-shifting in the Summers v.
Tice context is the relative culpability of the plaintiff and defend-
ant.169 In that case, the innocent plaintiff was shot from out of no-
where.7 0 The defendants, meanwhile, through their negligence
risked harming the plaintiff with the discharge of their guns-even
if one of the defendants did not shoot the bullet that hit the plain-
tiff-and their actions together led to the uncertainty about causa-
tion. Thus, even the "innocent" defendant-the defendant whose
shot did not connect-is in some sense culpable, and clearly more
culpable than the plaintiff.
This justification for burden-shifting is also present in the toxic
tort context. Indeed, corporate scientific gerrymandering can
properly be considered more culpable than mere negligence that ob-
scures causation. Unlike in the case of the careless shooter, the cor-
porate defendant who engages in scientific gerrymandering may do
so purposefully in the face of suspected or known risk in the name
of profit.1 7 ' While such defendants do not directly seek to harm
plaintiffs exposed to their products and may not know that disease
is substantially certain to result, they still engage in scientific gerry-
mandering purposefully, making their conduct akin to an intentional
tort with heightened conceptions of responsibility and culpability.7 2
169 See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2,4 (Cal. 1948) ("[D]efendants were neg-
ligent in so shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.... They are
both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff.").
170 See id. at 1.
171 Even the failure to exercise due care to discern product risk is culpable. See
Berger, supra note 166, at 2134 (proposing that "[i]f a corporation fails to exercise
the appropriate level of due care, it should be held liable to those put at risk by its
action, without regard to injuries that eventually ensue; it is culpable because it
has acted without taking into account the interests of those who will be affected
by its conduct."). And it is hard to imagine a "good reason" for engaging in scien-
tific gerrymandering that would make that conduct ethical. See generally David
G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHIL. FOUNDs. OF
TORT L. 201, 226 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) ("Thus, the basic ethic revealed to
lie behind responsibility for accidental harm is captured in the dual-faceted choice-
blame principle, that choosing to risk harm to others without good reason is blame-
worthy, but that so choosing for good reason is proper.").
172 See Owen, supra note 171, at 207, 218 (explaining the values underlying
tort law and observing that "a person should not choose to harm others solely to
advance interests of his own" and that "the bodily integrity interest is accorded a
higher abstract value than property"); see also id at 220 (reasoning that "conduct
is faulty, as a preliminary matter, if it reflects a choice to cause harm to another").
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Thus, as in Summers v. Tice, corporate defendants who engage in
scientific gerrymandering can be deemed more culpable than wholly
innocent exposed plaintiffs.
The foregoing analysis should not be taken to argue that Sum-
mers v. Tice burden-shifting applies whole cloth to toxic tort suits
involving scientific gerrymandering. As noted at the outset, one im-
portant aspect of Summers v. Tice is that the harm was negligently
caused and the burden was shifted to a group of defendants who
were all negligent and whose negligence obscured the question of
causation.173 The analysis does, however, show that two important
"reasons of policy and justice"174 underlying the Summers v. Tice
burden-shifting are not only present, but pronounced, in the context
of toxic tort suits accompanied by scientific gerrymandering. Those
reasons include the asymmetry of information between plaintiff and
defendant and the relative culpability of plaintiff and defendant.
That such burden-shifting reasons exist suggests that the risk of prej-
udicing a jury against the defendant is outweighed by the probative
value. In short, there is evidence that we are less concerned about
holding a defendant liable, even though they did not cause-or can-
not be proven to have caused-harm, if the defendant committed a
wrong and that wrong makes it harder to understand whether the
defendant caused the plaintiff's harm.'7 5
173 See, e.g., State Dep't of Env't Regul. v. CTL Distrib., Inc., 715 So. 2d 262,
264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("The case law addressing burden-shifting or market
share liability involves situations where each of the defendants acted negligently
but there was a lack of evidence as to which of the negligent defendants had caused
the plaintiff's injury."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28(b), § 28 cmt. F (AM. L. INST. 2010) (specifying that Sum-
mers v. Tice alternative-cause applies "[w]hen the plaintiff sues all of multiple
actors and proves that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff
to a risk of harm").
174 Tice, 199 P.2d at 5.
175 See Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 151, at 1632 (observing that
"common law courts have sometimes ... requir[ed] actors to disprove that they
caused harm when they are best situated to know how their activities might affect
others" and citing to shifting of the burden of proof under Summers v. Tice or in
response to evidence destruction and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 28 cmt. G (2013 3d ed.) (discussing how defendants' negligence and
asymmetrical access to information inform alternative liability) ("In at least some
cases, it appears that the defendants' better access to proof and doubts about the
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There are, moreover, non-frivolous arguments that can be made
for burden-shifting in these types of toxic tort cases, even though
such arguments would require an extension of existing doctrine. In
addition to alternative-cause doctrine and res ipsa loquitur, there is
a line of cases holding that a defendant's contribution to increased
risk can be used to show causation, as exemplified by Zuchowicz v.
United States.1'7 6 Some combination and extension of Summers v.
Tice, res ipsa doctrine, and cases holding that increased risk can be
used to show causation, could be invoked to permit burden-shifting
with respect to causation. These types of toxic tort cases arguably
fall within a category of tort cases "where the evidence that the de-
fendant was negligent was sufficient,'77 but where the evidence that
the plaintiff was injured on account of that negligence was seem-
ingly weak," or cases "in which it often was not clear whether (1)
negligent behavior (2) of the defendant was a cause of the injury."17 8
Judge Calabresi, discussing Summers v. Tice, res ipsa, and Zuchow-
icz, observed that "recently ... a consensus [has] developed that
such cases should go to a jury upon a relatively light showing by the
plaintiff of but for causation."'79 For present purposes, the above-
described doctrines are invoked for a much more limited purpose:
to explain why evidence of scientific gerrymandering is important
and should appropriately be considered in evaluating causation. If
such evidence prompts a jury to view the plaintiff's evidence on
causation more favorably, Summers v. Tice, res ipsa, and Zuchowicz
together help demonstrate why that outcome can be understood as a
doctrinally-grounded and rational inference as opposed to an un-
fairly prejudicial or improper basis for decision.
plaintiff's ability to extract that evidence from the defendants, even with modern
discovery, have influenced the courts to employ burden shifting.").
176 See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 391 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining
to overturn a trial court's finding that plaintiff who claimed to have developed a
fatal condition as a result of defendant negligently prescribing an excessive
amount of a drug had established causation even though plaintiff was not able to
produce epidemiological evidence linking the overdose to the condition).
77 In the present context, the negligent conduct might be conceived of as the
failure to warn about a suspected product risk, promoting exposure in the face of
suspected risk, or simply the failure to establish safety prior to exposure.
' Williams v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 391 F.3d 411, 429-31 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Calabresi, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 429-31.
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B. Spoliation
The familiar evidentiary doctrine of spoliation provides another
example of how the common law permits fact finders to consider
informational misconduct in making findings. Courts possess inher-
ent power to sanction parties for engaging in spoliation of evi-
dence-meaning destroying, altering, or failing to preserve evi-
dence relevant to an anticipated or pending legal action.'80 While
the showing required to justify the imposition of sanctions for spo-
liation differs across jurisdictions, typical requirements include:
first, that there be an obligation to preserve evidence, usually arising
from litigation or the reasonable anticipation of litigation; second,
that the party interfered with evidence with a culpable state of mind,
which, depending on the jurisdiction, could range from negligence
to bad faith; and third, that a reasonable fact finder could conclude
that the evidence would have been relevant.'81 Relevance in this
context means that "the lost evidence would have supported the
claims or defenses of the party that sought it,"' 82 but-im-
portantly-bad faith or willful spoliation can give rise to a presump-
tion that the missing evidence would have supported the opposing
party's claim.183 Sanctions for spoliation can include an adverse in-
ference instruction to the jury, meaning that the jury is invited to
infer that the missing evidence would have benefited the opposing
party. The spoliation doctrine thus permits the fact finder to alter
their interpretation of causation evidence, and even adjust causal
burdens, when there is bad faith conduct. If a court finds that con-
duct is sufficiently egregious, it may simply issue a default judgment
180 See Spoilation of Evidence, BoUvIER's LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).
181 See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 520-21 (D.
Md. 2010) (summarizing these requirements as the showing required in the Fourth
Circuit and observing that "[d]istrict courts in the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have identified the same factors for sanction-worthy spolia-
tion"); see also Jimenez-Sanchez v. Caribbean Rests., LLC, 483 F. Supp. 2d. 140,
143 (D.P.R. 2007) (explaining that an adverse inference instruction is warranted
where a foundation for spoliation is established by "evidence sufficient to permit
the trier of fact to find that the party against which the inference is sought to be
made knew of (1) the litigation or the potential of litigation and (2) the potential
relevance of the missing evidence to the litigation.").
182 Victor Stanley, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497 at 520-21.
183 See id. at 532 ("When the party alleging spoliation shows that the other party
acted willfully in failing to preserve evidence, the relevance of that evidence is
presumed in the Fourth Circuit.").
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against the defendant-a remedy that goes well beyond even bur-
den-shifting.184
Scientific gerrymandering, however, does not typically consti-
tute spoliation. Perhaps, if a defendant improperly failed to preserve
the results of a study assessing whether a chemical caused a harm,
the jury could infer that the study would have showed that the chem-
ical does in fact cause the harm. That said, scientific gerrymandering
typically encompasses much broader and earlier-in-time efforts to
slow, shape, distort, and limit the development and public availabil-
ity of scientific evidence. It might perhaps be better viewed as pre-
venting the creation of evidence, or predetermining and defining the
scope of available evidence, as opposed to destroying it.
Scientific gerrymandering does, however, bear salient similar-
ities to spoliation. Both spoliation and scientific gerrymandering in-
volve contexts where there is information asymmetry.185 Moreover,
in both contexts, the party with superior access to information ob-
tains or seeks to maintain its advantage in a culpable manner. And
in both contexts, it is often unknowable if the evidence would, in
fact, have aided the party who has made it unavailable. In the con-
text of spoliation, an allegedly malfunctioning product might disap-
pear before it can be examined; in the context of scientific gerry-
mandering, certain studies might simply never occur due to a
manufacturer's promotion of misleading evidence of safety, or a bo-
gus study may slow or taint the development of scientific under-
standing.186
184 See id. at 533-34 ("Sanctions that a federal court may impose for spoliation
include assessing attorney's fees and costs, giving the jury an adverse inference
instruction, precluding evidence, or imposing the harsh, case-dispositive sanctions
of dismissal or judgment by default.") (citing Goodman v. Praxair Servs., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 494, 506 (D. Md. 2009); Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal (In re NTL, Inc.
Sec. Litig.), 244 F.R.D. 179, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
185 See Wendy E. Wagner, What's It All About, Cardozo?, 80 TEx. L. REv.
1577, 1592-93 (2002) (observing that spoliation sanctions can be understood at
least partly as a means by which "courts might shift or adjust liability rules around
problems of asymmetrical information" where "the plaintiff ... is disadvantaged
by the defendant's superior access to information").
186 And this uncertainty can have important impacts on the assessment of cau-
sation in litigation. See Sanne H. Knudsen, Adversarial Science, 100 IowA L. REV.
1503, 1531 (2015) ("[G]enerating debate within the scientific literature has direct
and predictable consequences on the outcome of cases. Because the plaintiff bears
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In circumstances similar to scientific gerrymandering, the spo-
liation doctrine provides for a strong medicine of sanctions to deal
with comparable informational misconduct. Yet the current ap-
proach to scientific gerrymandering presents a stark difference. The
judicial posture toward scientific gerrymandering could be charac-
terized as one of judicial agnosticism, wherein judges treat scientific
gerrymandering like any other type of evidence. In certain instances,
the posture appears to be judicial deference to the gerrymanderers,
in light of the fact that judges seem inclined to protect gerrymander-
ers from evidence of their wrongdoing during the causation phase.
The similarities between spoliation and scientific gerrymandering
suggest that neither agnosticism nor deference is compelled and
may in fact be unwarranted. If anything, judges should adopt a hos-
tile posture toward gerrymanderers and be inclined to admit, rather
than exclude, evidence of scientific gerrymandering.
C. Admissibility of Scientific Gerrymandering Evidence During
Causation Phases, in Context
Against the backdrop of the tort and evidence doctrines de-
scribed above, in light of the balancing required by Federal Rule of
Evidence 403,187 and as compared to myriad proposals that will be
discussed below, our proposition is modest. We merely recommend
that judges should recognize the relevance of scientific gerryman-
dering, particularly during the causation phase of bifurcated toxic
tort suits. Scholars have proposed numerous significant reforms to
address the steep informational and evidentiary burden that plain-
tiffs face in establishing toxic tort causation. Margaret Berger offers
a proposed model under which "liability in negligence would be im-
posed for failure to provide substantial information relating to risk
and proof that the failure caused plaintiff's injury would not be re-
quired." 88 She reasons that "if a defendant is negligent in discover-
ing and disseminating substantial adverse information about its
the burden of proof, scientific uncertainty on issues like causation will almost al-
ways benefit the defendant."); see also MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at
97-156.
187 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the follow-
ing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wast-
ing time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.").
188 Berger, supra note 166, at 2143-44.
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product . .. it should be liable for adverse health effects in those
exposed, and plaintiffs should be relieved of proving general causa-
tion."189 Similarly, Wendy Wagner proposes that if a manufacturer
cannot publicize minimal safety research prior to marketing a prod-
uct, "the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that the insufficiently
tested product caused her harm." 90
Some reform proposals focus specifically on scientific gerry-
mandering. Robert McGarity proposes that when a defendant is
found to have engaged in scientific gerrymandering-like activities
such as "funding bogus science, screening and hiding negative stud-
ies, and stopping ongoing studies when they appeared to be going
the wrong way," courts should allow certain culpability-based
causal presumptions regarding general causation.191 Namely, if the
plaintiff proves to the jury's satisfaction that the defendant was cul-
pable, including by engaging in some types of scientific gerryman-
dering conduct,1 92 "a presumption ... arise[s] that the substance was
capable of causing the plaintiff's disease."193 These proposals, seek-
ing significantly more far-reaching reform, underscore the relative
modesty of requiring defendants to bear the risk that their scientific
gerrymandering may be admitted into evidence, and perhaps even
influence jury decisions on general causation.
The Federal Rules of Evidence also permit, if not compel, the
introduction of gerrymandering evidence, including during causa-
189 Id. at 2147. Notably, Berger makes this assertion after describing evidence
of how Merrell engaged in scientific gerrymandering with respect to Bendectin.
See id. at 2146-47.
190 Wagner, Choosing Ignorance, supra note 155, at 834-35 ("The plaintiff
thus establishes aprima facie case with proof of the following: (1) inadequate min-
imal testing on a product, (2) normal or foreseeable exposure to the product, and
(3) serious harm that might be causally linked to exposure to the product.").
191 McGarity, supra note 79, at 55 n.218.
192 As defined by McGarity, culpability would consist of: "(1) a significant vi-
olation by the defendant of existing state or federal regulatory requirements gov-
erning the sale, distribution, use or disposal of the agent; (2) a serious attempt to
manipulate inappropriately a state or federal agency risk assessment or standard
setting process applicable to the agent; or (3) a successful attempt to mislead at-
risk members of the public (including the plaintiff) with respect to the nature and
magnitude of the risk posed by the agent." Id. (citation omitted).
193 Id. at 57 ("The plaintiff would prevail on the general causation issue unless
the defendant proved with Daubert-reliable expert testimony that the substance
was incapable of causing the disease.").
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tion phases. Under the applicable doctrinal test, set forth in the Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence of scientific gerryman-
dering should be excluded only upon a finding that "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair preju-
dice."194 The above analysis illustrates that it is not unfairly preju-
dicial for juries to factor evidence of scientific gerrymandering into
their evaluation of the strength of causal evidence.95 Juries' evalu-
ations of causation in the shadow of scientific gerrymandering
should not be dismissed merely as "emotional" desires to punish bad
corporate behavior.'96 A jury may, in fact, be well positioned to dis-
cern the motivations behind gerrymandering and draw accurate con-
clusions about causation therefrom.'97 Indeed:
[T]he ability of twelve laypersons to interject human sensibilities
into a proceeding otherwise dominated by the cold logic of the
law arguably embodies the true worth of the jury system. This
ability adds to, rather than detracts from, truth and accuracy by
advancing the jury's empathic understanding of what the partic-
ipants likely did and why. 198
194 FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
195 Courts have noted that adverse inferences imposed as sanctions for spolia-
tion do not constitute unfair prejudice. Viewed through the lens of spoliation, there
is no prejudice created by admitting evidence of scientific gerrymandering. Even
if a jury were to infer that absent defendant's interference better scientific evidence
of a connection between defendant's chemical and plaintiff's harm would exist,
that simply speaks to the presence or absence of general causation-a proper basis
for decision. See Jimenez-Sanchez v. Caribbean Rests., LLC, 483 F. Supp. 2d.
140, 145 (D.P.R. 2007) ("The possibility of undue prejudice is not great, since
evidence of spoliation could only lead to a reasonable jury inferring that the [miss-
ing evidence] in some way hurt CR's case and that is not an improper basis for a
decision.").
196 Although even that, arguably, is not unfairly prejudicial. It is, indeed, a
jury's prerogative to infuse its decisions with normative assessments of culpabil-
ity. See Gold, supra note 154, at 504 ("Emotive aspects of a case have an effect
on a jury because those aspects are commonly perceived as vital to the rendition
of justice. Eliminating evidence with emotional appeal would thus also eliminate
public confidence in our system of laws as a moral force.").
197 Differentiating rigorous efforts to accurately discern the risk of chemicals
may in some cases be difficult to distinguish from strategic scientific gerryman-
dering, but presumably no more difficult than parsing the complex science of toxic
causation that judges and juries are regularly required to navigate. Indeed, juries
may be particularly suited to identifying and evaluating motive and culpability.
198 Gold, supra note 154, at 504.
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One need not accept, however, that introducing evidence of sci-
entific gerrymandering during the causation phase creates no risk of
unfair prejudice to conclude that, as a matter of straightforward ap-
plication of existing doctrine, it is admissible. It is enough to accept
any of the following propositions-that here is high probative value
to evidence of scientific gerrymandering, that it is not improper to
consider scientific gerrymandering when weighing causation, or
that even if there is a danger of unfair prejudice, it does not substan-
tially outweigh probative value. Furthermore, when evaluating
whether to exclude evidence as prejudicial, judges are meant to de-
liberate "with an appreciation of the offering party's need for evi-
dentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case."1 99
When evaluating probative value and prejudicial risk, the court con-
siders "the full evidentiary context of the case as the court under-
stands it."2 00 Here, recognizing how scientific gerrymandering can
shape the existing state of science on causation is an important, as-
pect of that evidentiary context.
In summary, evidence of scientific gerrymandering is often ap-
proached as dangerously likely to lead to unfair prejudice by encour-
aging jurors to ignore causal requirements and simply punish cor-
porate bad actors. Evidence of scientific gerrymandering is relevant
to causation and, moreover, even if jurors were to rely on evidence
of scientific gerrymandering improperly, giving greater credit to
plaintiffs' evidence of causation, well-established existing doctrines
such as alternative-cause, res ipsa loquitur, and spoliation indicate
that existing doctrine blesses reducing or even reversing causal bur-
dens where there is wrongful conduct that exacerbates asymmetrical
access to information. The arguments that have been offered to this
point have operated within existing doctrinal constructs. There are
also, however, powerful arguments that it is also normatively desir-
able to allow juries to hear evidence of scientific gerrymandering,
including during the causation phase. Notably, many of the same
normative rationales motivate the far more aggressive proposals,
199 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997).
200 Id. at 182 ("An item of evidence might be viewed as an island, with esti-
mates of its own probative value and unfairly prejudicial risk the sole reference
points in deciding whether the danger substantially outweighs the value and
whether the evidence ought to be excluded. Or the question of admissibility might
be seen as inviting further comparisons to take account of the full evidentiary con-
text of the case as the court understands it when the ruling must be made.").
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referenced above, to reform causal requirements in toxic tort litiga-
tion and address scientific gerrymandering.
IV. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Put simply: scientific gerrymandering is bad; tort law is a use-
ful and appropriate venue for surfacing and discouraging scientific
gerrymandering; and admitting evidence of scientific gerrymander-
ing during the causation phase enhances tort law's ability to function
in this manner. Notably, this normative case for greater policing of
scientific gerrymandering, particularly within the causation phase of
toxic tort trials, does not require fealty to one side or the other in the
larger, vociferous, and heated debate about the propriety and strin-
gency of causal requirements in toxic tort suits more generally.201
While admissibility during causation would likely be viewed as a
step in the right direction by those who favor reducing the causal
burdens of toxic tort plaintiffs, others might support it simply as a
means to dissuade scientific gerrymandering.
A. Scientific Gerrymandering Harms
Scientific gerrymandering exacerbates the risk of harmful
chemical exposures, undermines public confidence in the public
health system, and contributes to public anxiety about personal
safety. Many-most notably, Wendy Wagner-have argued persua-
sively that existing regulatory and common law regimes combine to
discourage quality research into the health effects of chemicals,
leading to widespread public exposure to chemicals of uncertain
201 Compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and
Toxic Torts, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1312 (1998) (arguing that reduced causal
burdens in toxic tort "would produce a series of adverse effects. . . . The direct
adverse effects would include a massive increase in the use of scarce judicial re-
sources to decide toxic tort cases, a massive increase in the cost of many socially
beneficial products, and unavailability of many socially beneficial products. The
indirect effects would include deterioration in the overall health of the popula-
tion."), with Berger, supra note 166, at 2119 ("[E]liminating causation furthers tort
law's corrective justice rationale that liability is linked to moral responsibility."),
and McGarity, supra note 79, at 6 ("[C]ausation has proven a very effective stum-
bling block that has not only precluded compensation for all but the most clearly
understood environmentally caused diseases, but has also stood in the way of am-
bitious attempts to protect the public health generally through toxic tort litiga-
tion.").
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safety.202 In this account, the tort and regulatory systems discourage
manufacturers from undertaking research in the first instance. This
is because, first, the difficulty of discerning long-term health im-
pacts associated with specific chemicals makes it hard for plaintiffs
to establish causation for such long-term impacts, rendering it un-
likely that the tort system will impose liability on defendants.203 Sec-
ond, manufacturers recognize that internal research that suggests or
reveals a health risk could spur regulation or become evidence in a
tort suit.204 Reports or suspicions of adverse health effects may spur
additional inquiry by a manufacturer, but sometimes the response is
to scientifically gerrymander. For instance, the company might con-
duct an inquiry-or orchestrate an attack campaign-focused on ex-
onerating a chemical as opposed to objectively investigating its ef-
fects.205 Scientific gerrymandering can, in this way, impede the
recognition, prompt assessment, informed regulation, and even
medical treatment of a chemical's potential health risk, thereby in-
creasing the magnitude of exposure in terms of duration, extent, and,
in some cases, health consequences. Delays occasioned by scientific
gerrymandering can thus extend an already lengthy process for un-
derstanding risks.206 Even in the best of all possible worlds-with
prompt detection of a risk and diligent efforts to study it-"time is
needed" because "[e]xcept in the atypical case in which a rare and
serious effect is almost instantly discernible, an immediate answer
will not be forthcoming; often a considerable interval must elapse
202 See, e.g., Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 151, at 1625-59; Wag-
ner, Choosing Ignorance, supra note 155, at 790-95 (detailing how the common
law system, including the requirement that plaintiff prove causation, creates disin-
centives for manufacturers to develop information about product risk).
203 Wagner, Choosing Ignorance, supra note 155, at 791-96.
204 See id.
205 See Thomas O. McGarity, Defending Clean Science from Dirty Attacks by
Special Interests, in RESCUING SCI. FROM POL. 24 (Wagner & Steiznor, eds. 2006)
("When a new scientific study suggests that an industry's products or activities
may be causing unanticipated adverse effects on health or the environment, a typ-
ical reaction by that industry or other affected stakeholders is to attack the mes-
senger.").
206 See MCGARrvY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 97-156 (describing how man-
ufacturers hide or attack science in ways that delay proper regulation and protec-
tion, including with respect to tobacco, MTBE, TCE, BPA and tremolite asbestos).
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before the scientific community reaches even tentative conclusions
on issues of causation."207
Sometimes, this will not result in actual, physical harm as the
chemical will ultimately be exonerated; other times, it will result in
more individuals being exposed for longer periods at higher levels
and delay monitoring for and treatment of any associated health ef-
fects.208 Either way, it increases the period in which individuals lack
the opportunity to make an informed choice about whether to expose
themselves to a chemical in light of the suspected health risk.
Among those who are exposed, it also extends the anxiety-produc-
ing period of uncertainty about the effects of exposure once a sus-
pected risk becomes known and is being further examined.209
Scientific gerrymandering also dupes regulators and the public.
Once exposed, it thereby undermines public faith in, and the integ-
rity and efficacy of, laws and institutions tasked with protecting hu-
man health and the environment.210 Doubt about whether the exist-
ing system protects against chemical risk contributes to a broader
sense of vulnerability and anxiety about personal safety as well as
loss of control over bodily integrity.211 Thomas McGarity asserts
207 Berger, supra note 166, at 2119 (citing to the development of information
about the health risks posed by asbestos as an example).
208 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 127 (discussing the fact that
releasing preliminary results may "unnecessarily frighten the public").
209 And the period of dread with respect to exposure and possible latent disease
imposes a significant psychological burden that should not be dismissed lightly.
See Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Tortious Toxics, 26 WM. &
MARY ENv'T L. & POL'Y REv. 67, 79-80 (2001) ("[L]atent threats are special in
this sense: they can convert what would otherwise be a discrete, diffuse kind of
harm-one death here, another there-into a catastrophe that tears the web of a whole
community. When an exposed community will not know for many years whether
anyone will fall ill or die as a result of their exposure, when, indeed, they may
never know whether the illnesses and deaths they experience came from the expo-
sure or from something else, the whole community becomes involved in the threat
of death-even if, ultimately, only a handful of illnesses and deaths will reasonably
be attributed to the exposure they fear. A long temporal lag between exposure and
physical effects can thus transform a diffuse and individual harm into a collective
harm, a disaster.").
210 See generally Carl F. Cranor, The Dual Legacy of Daubert, in RESCUING
SCI. FROM POL. 122 (Wagner & Steiznor, eds. 2006) (concluding that as a result of
scientific gerrymandering, "[t]he legitimacy of the law as an institution is being
threatened").
211 Indeed, some have suggested that the growth of the wellness industry re-
flects, in part, anxiety about he need to protect oneself from toxic exposures. See
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
224 [Volume 29
SCIENTIFIC GERRYMANDERING & BIFURCATION
that existing causation rules encourage scientific gerrymandering
and are likely to lead to what he terms an "accountability crisis":
[The] . . . comforting message to corporate America [is] that
companies will not be held liable in tort for damages they did not
clearly cause will be heard by at least some companies as an in-
vitation to press the limits of corporate responsibility. The re-
cently exposed tobacco documents reveal with startling clarity
how potential toxic tort defendants can "bend science" to meet
their litigative and public relations needs. That capacity and the
general inability of resource-strained regulatory agencies to un-
cover and punish illegitimate attempts to manipulate the regula-
tory process will combine to produce an accountability crisis that
will ultimately precipitate strong political demands to change the
system.212
Scientific gerrymandering thus inflicts harms on our institu-
tions and systems of government, and on the public sense of security
and well-being that are independent of any manifested health impact
related to chemical exposure.21 3
For society as a whole, the negative consequences of scientific
gerrymandering outweigh any potential utility of such conduct. It
could be argued that transparency about suspected health harms and
worrisome initial study results would create more public anxiety, as
it is often difficult for laypeople to understand information about
chemical testing and risk, which can create unnecessary fear about
DAVID WALLACE WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH 185 (2019) ("[H]owever
manipulated by marketing consultants, and however dubious its claim to health-
fulness, wellness also gives a clear name and shape to a growing perception even,
or especially, among those wealthy enough to be insulated from the early assaults
of climate change: that the contemporary world is toxic, and that to endure or
thrive within it requires extraordinary measures of self-regulation and self-purifi-
cation.").
212 McGarity, supra note 79, at 3-4.
213 See generally MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 229-30 ("The pub-
lic's faith in science, while never easy to measure, may finally be eroding under
the steady flow of reports of manipulated and distorted research."). Notably, a key
rationale for spoliation sanctions is protection of the judicial system itself, not just
compensation for party's unjustly denied access to evidence. See also Spotted
Horse v. BNSF Ry. Co., 350 P.3d 52, 57-58 (Mont. 2015) ("The intentional or
negligent destruction or spoliation of evidence cannot be condoned and threatens
the very integrity of our judicial system.").
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chemicals that will ultimately be proven safe.214 In a system
cleansed of scientific gerrymandering, however, the public could
better trust that manufacturers would share information and work
cooperatively with regulators to promptly and diligently evaluate
product risk, limiting the perceived need for individuals to self-po-
lice exposures.
If, in the absence of scientific gerrymandering, quicker and
more thorough cooperative investigation leads to a regulatory pause
in the use of a chemical, it could also be argued that this deprives
the public of the benefit of the chemical in the interim.215 One might
take the view that most chemicals turn out to be safe and thus scien-
tific gerrymandering is actually beneficial in that it forestalls unnec-
essary limits on chemical use or private eschewing of chemicals dur-
ing the extended period required to establish product safety. A
difficulty with this view is that scientific gerrymandering is not cost-
less, even when a chemical ultimately turns out not to pose physical
harm. As described above, scientific gerrymandering imposes inde-
pendent and significant systemic and institutional harms. Moreover,
it is hard to justify entrusting decisions about whether and when the
utility of a chemical should outweigh risks from exposure to the
manufacturer, who has a strong incentive to overvalue utility. 216
214 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VicIOUs CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIvE RISK REGULATION 36-39 (1993) (explaining the difficulties of com-
municating risk to the lay public and the potential for overreaction); W. Kip Vis-
cusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43
FOOD DRUG CoSM. L.J. 283, 288 (1988) (analyzing consumer esponse to risk in-
formation, in particular information about small risks, and concluding in part that
"when individuals are informed of small risks there will be a tendency for them to
over-react to the information and to treat the risk as being greater than it actually
is. It will be very difficult to convey information to people in a meaningful fashion
about very low probability risks. Perhaps the major danger from any risk-commu-
nication effort is that instead of informing people these programs will serve to
unduly alarm them").
215 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 5, at 127.
216 See id at 104 ("While scientific norms counsel against the premature release
of incompletely analyzed or vetted fmdings, in public health research this norm is
countered by the worrisome possibility that leaving the decision of when to share
preliminary evidence of adverse effects solely to sponsors or their researchers
could lead to under-protective, self-interested decisions by manufacturers to 'wait
and see."').
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It can also be argued that even diligent corporate efforts to iden-
tify, understand, and manage chemical risks may, ex post, be mis-
characterized as scientific gerrymandering.2 1" Indeed, companies
engaged in scientific gerrymandering might not be as morally cul-
pable as they appear; they might, for example, be motivated by a
genuine belief that a chemical is useful and safe, as opposed to a
calculated decision to minimize or hide health risks. Another con-
cern is that companies contemplating the legal implications of per-
ceived scientific gerrymandering might find their approach to the
assessment of risks chilled, as concerns about appearing to have sci-
entifically gerrymandered might cause them to replace inquiry with
inaction, exacerbating gaps in knowledge about chemical risks.
These concerns, while fairly raised, do not seem significant on
closer examination. Evidence of scientific gerrymandering is some-
times already admissible, albeit often at a later phase of trial, and
judges must already make evidentiary rulings relating to its admis-
sibility. Difficulties relating to line-drawing and admissibility are
thus already present in the existing system; the current proposal just
raises the stakes relating to the outcome of that line-drawing exer-
cise by pushing it to the causation phase. Thus, any "chilling" of
good scientific inquiry would be incremental. And, for a variety of
reasons explained further below, the tort system, while not perfect,
may be best positioned to reveal and address scientific gerryman-
dering in a responsible fashion, because it includes mechanisms for
weeding out baseless accusations of gerrymandering. Importantly,
it provides a structure wherein corporate defendants have the oppor-
tunity, typically with the benefit of very able legal counsel, to ex-
plain corporate decisions and actions relating to the assessment of
risk.
With respect to chilling corporate information-gathering re-
lated to chemical effects, while it is possible that companies might
respond to more robust policing of scientific gerrymandering in lit-
igation with a "see no evil, hear no evil" approach, it seems just as
likely-if not more likely-that companies might be advised to
avoid an appearance of impropriety when evaluating risks. Avoid-
ing the appearance of impropriety-which would presumably in-
clude increased transparency and taking care to ensure objectivity
217 Id. at 127 (discussing the "dilemma" faced by private sector entities).
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in analysis-could improve the type and quality of scientific in-
quiry. Finally, while scientific gerrymandering may sometimes be
motivated by a genuine but mistaken belief-nurtured by the rose-
tinted glasses of corporate culture-that a chemical is indeed safe,
the fact that corporate teams are susceptible to this type of optimism
bias suggests that greater transparency is needed to provide a more
objective assessment of even early hints of chemical-related risk.218
B. Institutional Suitability of Tort Law
Tort law is generally recognized as an effective process to fer-
ret out evidence of scientific gerrymandering, particularly as com-
pared to the regulatory process.219 The adversary process provides
plaintiff attorneys with the incentive and means, through the discov-
ery process, to surface evidence of scientific gerrymandering.22 0 In-
deed, "[t]he success of litigants in uncovering and exposing sup-
pressed adverse research is a signature feature of most toxic tort
claims."22' Judges can perform an effective gatekeeping function
with respect to sorting, identifying, and making rulings on the ad-
missibility of conduct that constitutes scientific gerrymandering,
providing some assurance that courts can weed out false or baseless
accusations of scientific gerrymandering.
Of course, even if tort law is good at discovering scientific ger-
rymandering, this does not speak to whether it is good at responding
218 See generally Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About
Science, 106 GEo. L.J. 447, 499 (2018) (collecting sources describing how opti-
mism bias and other cognitive biases can shape corporate knowledge and decision-
making).
219 See McGarity, supra note 79, at 60-61 ("One of the considerable advantages
of a tort reparations regime is its capacity to get to the truth of the matter in ways
that are largely unavailable to regulatory agencies engaged in traditional rule-mak-
ing and enforcement.") (citation omitted); Berger supra note 166, at 2150 (refer-
encing tort law's ability to "ferret out smoking guns"). See generally Wagner,
When All Else Fails, supra note 151, at 697-701 (explaining the myriad ad-
vantages that courts enjoy regarding access to information about the risk of prod-
ucts held by manufacturers as compared to political and regulatory processes).
220 See McGarity, supra note 79, at 60-61 ("Private attorneys ... are adept at
uncovering evidence of culpability in the discovery that precedes common law
trials, and they are willing to spend the resources necessary to copy and organize
documents, take depositions, and fight the company's efforts to resist discovery.").
221 Wagner, When All Else Fails, supra note 151, at 711.
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to or deterring revealed scientific gerrymandering. One strong argu-
ment concerning tort law generally is that it is an inadvisable mech-
anism for redressing scientific gerrymandering since it is blunt and
overly punitive. More specifically, evidence of scientific gerryman-
dering in toxic tort suits, particularly when presented during the cau-
sation phase, may increase the risk that liability will be imposed for
phantom harms-cases where a chemical does not in fact cause
plaintiff's harm. Richard Nagareda, for example, critiques mass tort
litigation for serving as a means of moral condemnation by punish-
ing defendants' bad behavior-for instance, failing to warn about
possible health risks or lying about widely known health risks
even when that behavior does not cause plaintiffs' harm, whether
because the possible health risks are ultimately disproved or be-
cause, despite defendants' fraud, plaintiffs knew the risks posed by
the product.222 He argues that this moral condemnation should occur
"not through the vehicle of tort litigation but, if at all, through dem-
ocratic deliberation in the political process."223
Nagareda's arguments are persuasive in some circumstances,
but significantly less so where, as in the case of scientific gerryman-
dering, the defendant's misconduct actively obscures the causal
question itself. When defendants gerrymander the science about
product risks, they not only decline to share information about pos-
sible risk with plaintiffs, but-recognizing a potential risk about
which they have exclusive knowledge-actively seek to discourage
the objective assessment of the nature of the risk, which can hinder
the development of regulation that could minimize the number of
individuals exposed. As explained above, this not only denies con-
sumers of informed consent and exposes them to possible risk
through a failure to warn, but also (1) extends the duration of uncer-
tainty and fear for exposed individuals until the scientific uncer-
tainty can be resolved;224 and (2) causes a delay in scientific under-
standings of the risk, which can, in turn, delay identification and
222 See Nagareda, supra note 147, at 1122-25 (referring to this situation as one
of "outrageous fortune," or "situations in which a manufacturer may have engaged
in conduct that many might regard as irresponsible or morally culpable, but where
that manufacturer, nonetheless, may have had the sheer good luck not to cause
harm to consumers").
223 Id at 1125.
224 See generally Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, su-
pra note 7 (explaining the dread of toxic exposure and latent disease).
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treatment of effects and increase the number of individuals exposed,
the intensity of their exposure, and the severity of adverse conse-
quences.22s Notably, these harms-extended periods of fear and un-
certainty, an increase in the magnitude of the harm risked-arise
whether or not the product in fact causes the suspected harm.
Permitting evidence of scientific gerrymandering to be factored
into causation is thus warranted even though it may lead to an in-
creased risk of imposing liability where there is not in fact causation.
This is so for several reasons. As an initial matter, liability without
causation does not impose unusually pronounced justice concerns in
this context. While the increase in risk cannot be quantified, it is
useful to recall that defendants possess numerous tools to respond
to and rebut allegations of scientific gerrymandering and its effect
on causal knowledge.226 Juries may conclude that there was no ger-
rymandering, or that even in its absence, a chemical would not have
been more closely linked to harm. The extent of the risk of erroneous
findings on causation and liability is thus unclear, but there are rea-
sons to believe it is not overwhelming. It is also useful to recall that
"there is a risk of error whenever circumstantial evidence is relied
on in reaching findings of negligence"227 and that, with respect to
many substances, there is unlikely to be definitive evidence or con-
sensus about harm.22 8
225 See Berger, supra note 166 at 2143 ("The failure to disseminate information
about the ill-effects of asbestos, known to its manufacturers from a wide variety
of sources, undoubtedly delayed the regulation of asbestos products. As a conse-
quence, many workers and their families suffered exposures to asbestos, some of
which produced, or will produce, disease and, in some instances, death.").
226 Defendants can also benefit from increased admissibility to the extent that
plaintiffs' attorneys attempt to gerrymander science. See MCGARITY & WAGNER,
supra note 5, at 29-32 (explaining how plaintiffs' attorney can attempt to bend
science, although typically not to the same extent and effect as chemical manufac-
turers).
227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 17 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (recognizing that this risk of error "does produce
an element of discomfort [in the context of res ipsa], inasmuch as the defendant
can be found negligent without any evidence as to the nature or circumstances of
the defendant's actual conduct.").
228 See CRANOR, supra note 1, at 270 ("Given the widespread ignorance about
substances, a better presumption would be that there might be little or no human
epidemiological evidence and no mechanistic information about the effects of any
particular substance.").
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Moreover, when the risk of error comes to fruition and a de-
fendant is held liable for a specific harm that it did not in fact cause,
it is not so objectionable in the present context. After all, the act of
scientific gerrymandering is itself culpable and imposes independ-
ent harms that are tightly linked to causation.229 Additionally, while
tort law generally eschews liability for negligence that does not
cause harm, the type of negligence confronted here is distinct. As
one scholar has noted:
It is one thing to allow individual misbehavior that puts a few
lives at risk to go unpunished and thus undeterred by the tort sys-
tem. . .. It is quite another thing to allow a company to put thou-
sands of lives at risk negligently with no common law or criminal
remedy, as occurs in the toxic tort context when exposed plain-
tiffs are unable to prove causation.23 0
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, defendant manufactur-
ers are in a position to reduce the risk ex ante by taking care not to
engage in scientific gerrymandering. Wagner's account of outcomes
in the breast implant litigation illustrates this point well.231 Manu-
facturers knew about and suppressed evidence that silicone implants
could leak, which in turn contributed to large jury awards for plain-
tiffs.232 Once research developed, showing that the leaked silicone
did not in fact cause connective tissue and autoimmune diseases,
jury verdicts petered off, causing Wagner to conclude that:
[H]ad the manufacturers conducted research on the safety of im-
plants prior to marketing and made that information available to
juries, jury verdicts would likely have been favorable to
them.... [T]he very fact that they took advantage of their asym-
metric access to information and withheld information from pa-
tients contributed to juries awarding significant judgments
against them.233
229 See generally Wagner, Choosing Ignorance, supra note 155, at 816 ("The
traditional common-law approach to assigning responsibility for proving causation
in toxic tort cases creates, at least in theory, a 'recurring miss'; manufacturers can
act negligently, but avoid liability precisely because of that misconduct.") (citation
omitted).
230 Bernstein, supra note 147, at 504.
231 See Wagner, When All Else Fails, supra note 151, at 715-17.
232 See id.
233 Id.
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Inviting evidence of scientific gerrymandering into the causa-
tion phase would thus deter scientific gerrymandering, place the risk
of an inaccurate finding of causation on the defendant who engaged
in scientific gerrymandering, and afford the plaintiff some correc-
tion for the impoverished and distorted state of scientific knowledge
on causation. Notably, this parallels the "prophylactic, punitive, and
remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine" which "serve
both normative-designed to punish culpable conduct and deter it
in others-and compensatory-designed to put the party adversely
affected by the spoliation in a position that is as close to what it
would have been in had the spoliation not occurred-functions."234
These functions are to "(1) deter parties from engaging in spoliation;
(2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrong-
fully created the risk; and (3) restore the prejudiced party to the same
position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of
evidence by the opposing party."235
There is thus a strong normative case that courts should seek to
discourage scientific gerrymandering and that admitting more evi-
dence of such conduct, particularly in the causation phase of toxic
tort trials, could do so. Scientific gerrymandering gives rise to indi-
vidual, societal, and institutional harms-forcing guinea pig con-
sumers to take a high stakes gamble, creating fear of potential dis-
ease in those exposed, and undermining trust in regulatory bodies-
even when the chemical it shields from scrutiny is ultimately proven
to be benign. Tort law processes can enable the discovery of evi-
dence of scientific gerrymandering while providing protections
against its misuse. Strong doctrinal claims exist that support admit-
ting evidence of scientific gerrymandering, suggesting that it is not
only possible but relatively easy to achieve these important norma-
tive aims.
CONCLUSION
Scientific gerrymandering that slows and obscures timely and
objective understanding of chemical risks is unfortunately just one
234 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 533-34 (D. Md.
2010) (citations omitted).
235 Id.
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manifestation of a broader problem of strategic manipulation of sci-
ence. What we offer here is a small fix that chips away at the broader
problem in a single context. But, it is a fix that is realistic, could be
immediately and readily realized, and has the potential to discourage
scientific gerrymandering behavior.
In Hardeman, Judge Chhabria reasoned that internal Monsanto
deliberations about how to "sway a scientist" or get a scientist to
"move from his position" were likely inadmissible under Rule 403
because they were "only tangentially relevant" and "a significant
distraction" during the causation phase.2 36 We have endeavored to
show that such evidence is not just relevant, but provides important
context for a jury to understand, weigh, and interpret the complex
body of scientific learning, and evaluate the totality of the scientific
evidence. Such evidence is also unlikely to be unfairly prejudicial.
Even if evidence of scientific gerrymandering causes jurors to give
greater credit to plaintiff's evidence of causation, well-established
doctrines, such as alternative-cause, res ipsa loquitur, and spolia-
tion, reduce or even reverse causal burdens when wrongful conduct
exacerbates asymmetrical access to information. Finally, from a
normative perspective, scientific gerrymandering harms individu-
als, society, and institutions; a more open embrace of the airing of
such evidence could deter corporate actors from engaging in gerry-
mandering behavior. In short, our small but significant aim is to
challenge prevailing assumptions that evidence of scientific gerry-
mandering is barely, if at all, relevant to causation and is highly
likely to cause unfair prejudice. As such, when judges are faced with
the task of developing "guided principles"237 to govern scientific
gerrymandering admissibility, particularly in bifurcated trials, if
they follow our proposal, those principles will properly reflect the
value of evidence of scientific gerrymandering.
By presenting strong doctrinal and normative explanations for
why and how scientific gerrymandering efforts are relevant to cau-
sation and are appropriate for jury consideration during the causa-
tion phase of bifurcated toxic tort suits, we hope to lend force to
plaintiffs' arguments for the admissibility of evidence of scientific
236 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 4, at 5-8 (recognizing that such evi-
dence might come in through impeachment).
237 See id. at 5 (announcing "guided principles that will apply to ... admis-
sion").
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gerrymandering and to encourage judges to more readily admit such
evidence. This would discourage companies from engaging in even
the appearance of scientific gerrymandering, and potentially hold
them accountable when they do. Allowing evidence of scientific
gerrymandering may change incentives sufficiently such that, in-
stead of abruptly halting studies with initial adverse outcomes,
working to silence concerned voices, and attempting to stack the
deck with covertly-funded and rigged studies, chemical companies
would take care to encourage objective investigation and rigorous
testing.
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